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Class voting for radical-left parties in Western Europe:

The libertarian vs. authoritarian class trade-off

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Abstract: Which classes vote for radical-left parties (RLPs) in Western Europe? Have these parties become the domain of highly educated socio-cultural professionals, or can they still attract support from the working class? Building on previous work on class voting in the two-dimensional policy space, this article show how class voting for RLPs is shaped these parties' positions on the cultural dimension of political competition. Combining voter-level data from the European Social Survey (2002 to 2018) with information on RLPs' positions for 12 Western European countries, we find evidence of a class trade-off: RLPs with more authoritarian positions receive relatively more support from production workers but relatively less support from socio-cultural professionals. These findings add to evidence that parties shape class voting. Ours is the first study to demonstrate that this is true for RLPs as well, showing how, in the early 21st century, cultural positions matter for class voting.

Keywords: Class voting; cleavages; radical-left parties; realignment; two-dimensional policy space

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1. Introduction

For some time now, some parts of the Western European left have lamented an increasing alienation of its traditional core constituency, especially the "working class". This discussion has also not escaped Europe's far left, or "radical-left" parties (RLPs). In Germany, for example, Sarah Wagenknecht (2021)—a leading politician of the RLP "The Left" ("Die Linke")—recently published a book in which she attacked "self-righteous lifestyle leftists" for leading a "culture war" against all those who do not adhere to their "left-liberal" conception of a progressive society. This, Wagenknecht claims, would have alienated working class voters. Implicit to such provocative statements is the suggestion that there is a class trade-off associated with the positions RLPs take on cultural issues. Is there such a trade-off?

In this article, we provide evidence that there indeed is such a class trade-off. Combining data from the European Social Survey (ESS) for over 100,000 voters with party position data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) for 51 elections in 12 Western European countries, we find that production workers are less likely to vote for RLPs when these hold more libertarian positions. Our analysis robustly supports the conclusion that the more authoritarian RLPs are, the higher their support among production workers relative to their support among socio-cultural professionals.

Our study makes important contributions to three strands of literature. First, we contribute to the literature on the voters of RLPs (e.g., Beaudonnet and Gomez, 2017; Gomez and Ramiro, 2019; Wagner 2021). This literature has not reached a clear consensus on which classes vote for RLPs. Our study suggests that one reason for this lack in consensus is that class voting differs across contexts, and that one reason why it differs are the heterogenous cultural positions of RLPs. Second, we contribute to previous evidence showing that party positions shape class voting (Angelucci and Vittori, 2021; Evans and Tilley, 2012; 2017). This literature has focused

on the mainstream left and the economic stances of these parties (but see: Abou-Chadi and Wagner, 2020). We provide the first evidence on the top-down nature of class voting for RLPs, showing that, for RLPs in the early 21st century, it is positions on cultural issues that matter. Third, our study thereby underscores the usefulness of the two-dimensional model for understanding (class) voting in contemporary Western Europe (e.g., Harteveld, 2016; Kriesi et al., 2008; Oesch and Rennwald, 2018).

The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section two discusses previous work on class voting in Western Europe's two-dimensional policy space and how it is affected by party positions. Section three turns to RLPs, reviews previous work on their electorates and presents our hypotheses. In section four, we discuss data and methods. Section five presents our results, and the sixth section concludes.

2. Class voting in the two-dimensional policy space and the role of party positions

As much contemporary research on Western Europe, and developed democracies elsewhere, our argument builds on the premise that political competition today involves two main dimensions: An economic and a second "cultural" axis (e.g., Dalton, 2018; Gidron 2022; Hooghe et al. 2002; Hillen and Steiner, 2020; Kriesi et al., 2008; Lefkofridi et al., 2014; Oesch and Rennwald, 2018). The economic dimension revolves around traditional economic "left-right" issues such as redistribution, the size of taxes, the generosity of the welfare state, or state interventions in the market. The labelling of the "second" or "new politics" dimension is more controversial, yet scholars agree on its main contents. Here, we speak of a "cultural dimension". Its poles may be described as "libertarian" vs. "authoritarian" (Kitschelt, 1994) or, more comprehensively, as "green/alternative/libertarian" ("GAL") vs. "traditionalist/authoritarian/nationalist" ("TAN") (Hooghe et al., 2002). Authoritarians espouse

traditional morality, law and order, cultural conformity and aim to restrict immigration, whereas libertarians support cultural as well as ethnic diversity and champion individual freedoms. While the two-dimensional model is a simplification of the complex reality of political competition, it has proven instrumental to understand important phenomena such as the effects of issue cross-pressures and issue salience on voting (Gidron, 2022; Lefkodfridi et al., 2014; Steiner and Hillen, 2021), different levels of political support and electoral turnout in the quadrants of the policy space (Hakverdian and Schakel, 2022; Hillen and Steiner, 2020), the electoral roots of unequal representation (Rosset and Kurella, 2021), or the effect of left parties on the welfare state (Hillen, 2022).

Another important area where fundamental insights have been gained from applying the two-dimensional model is the voting behavior of social classes (e.g., Arzheimer, 2013; Abou-Chadi and Wagner, 2020; Dalton, 2018; Häusermann and Kriesi, 2015; Harteveld, 2016; Kriesi et al., 2008; Oesch and Rennwald, 2018; Spies, 2013). Behind this body of research lies the idea that if we know the typical locations of social classes in the two-dimensional policy space, and know where the parties are located, a spatial voting perspective in the tradition of Downs (1957) allows us to predict which social classes will vote for which parties and why. In this study, we contribute to this line of research by studying the neglected case of "class voting"—by which we simply mean how class is associated with party choice—for RLPs from the two-dimensional perspective.

Regarding our general theoretical argument, we depart most closely from Oesch and Rennwald (2018). These authors theorize and investigate how occupational classes' different policy positions in the two-dimensional policy space lead to distinct patterns of class voting for parties of the left, center-right and radical-right in Western Europe. A key ingredient of their argument is the consideration that political preferences are shaped by individuals' position in the labor market and the work logics they operate with on a daily basis (Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014;

Oesch, 2006; Oesch and Rennwald, 2018). As individuals generalize from these experiences at the work place, forming political preferences accordingly, it is not only economic attitudes that will differ between occupational classes but attitudes on cultural issues as well. Positions on both dimensions will in turn shape which parties members of different classes support at the ballot boxes.

Oesch and Rennwald (2018) test their argument on data from the ESS, from 2002 to 2014. We reproduce the average positions they report for the eight occupational classes from the Oesch (2006) class scheme in Figure 1. This schematic representation is also in line with similar findings reported in other studies (Ares, 2022; Häusermann and Kriesi, 2015; Harteveld, 2016; Kriesi et al., 2008). Of particular interest for our argument are production workers and socio-cultural professionals. While both classes tend to be left-wing on economic issues, they are at opposite ends of the cultural dimension: Socio-cultural professionals typically hold libertarian positions towards immigration and cultural value questions, which production workers tend to oppose.

Figure 1: Social classes and RLPs in the two-dimensional policy space



Note: Schematic depiction of social classes' typical positions in the two-dimensional policy space based on Oesch and Rennwald (2018). Location of radical left-parties added, as discussed below.

These difference in classes' issue positions go along with distinct patterns in class voting. Oesch and Rennwald (2018) find socio-cultural professionals to overwhelmingly vote for parties from the left bloc, thus forming a "party preserve" of the left. Production workers would form a "contested stronghold": While left parties had a "traditional working-class stronghold", production workers now increasingly vote for parties of the radical-right based on proximity on the cultural dimension—a realignment that has been documented in other studies as well (e.g., Arzheimer, 2013; Spies, 2013).

While illuminating, there are two crucial limitations of Oesch and Rennwald's (2018) study. The first is the decision to concentrate on the rough distinction between three partly blocs. This ignores important differences within each bloc. Within the left, for example, we may distinguish

between the mainstream social-democratic left, the new-left Greens and the radical left. These party families differ in their positions, and this, in turn, is bound to affect the class composition of their electorates. Second, Oesch and Rennwald's (2018) schematic approach ignores the variation in policy positions among individual parties, even within narrower defined party families. In this study, we address both of these limitations in that we study class voting for RLPs in detail, and how it varies with the positions these parties take on the cultural dimension.

In doing so, we build on a growing body of work that shows how party positions shape the voting behavior of social classes. Most of these studies concentrate on mainstream left/social-democratic parties, and on these parties' positions on the economic dimension (Angelucci and Vittori, 2021; Evans and Tilley, 2012; 2017). These studies show that working class voters vote for mainstream left parties only to the extent these parties present distinct economic policy alternatives in line with the interests and preferences of the working class. However, there are few studies that investigate the effects of party positions beyond (a) the economic policy dimension (but see: Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2020; Angelucci and Vittori 2021) and (b) beyond the mainstream left (but see: Harteveld 2016).

Studying social democratic parties' *cultural* positions, Abou-Chadi and Wagner (2020) report that socio-cultural and self-employed professionals become more likely to vote for social-democratic parties when these parties adopt more libertarian positions. Yet, more authoritarian positions do not seem to attract more working-class support.[2] An important follow-up question is whether the same holds for RLPs. We conjecture that RLPs may be in a better position to attract voters from disadvantaged strata through authoritarian positions. Their "radical character", which is primarily based on economic issues (see below), could enable more

[2] For seemingly conflicting evidence see Angelucci and Vittori (2021), who study the "old" left-wing bloc as a whole, however.

authoritarian cultural positions. For example, their criticism of "neoliberal" capitalism and economic globalization may be combined with more critical positions towards immigration policies, as another facet of globalization.

Harteveld (2016) studies how the economic policy positions adopted by radical-right parties (RRPs) shape their levels of support among different social classes. Harteveld demonstrates that RRPs with more left-wing economic position tend to gain increased support from workers and the lower educated, at the cost of decreased support from highly-educated professionals. In this study, we argue that this pattern is mirrored for the radical left and the cultural positions these take.

In sum, previous research has demonstrated that class-party proximity in the two-dimensional policy space shapes class voting. This perspective is not only helpful to understand why classes opt for parties of different party families, but also for understanding how, within party families, positions of individual parties shape class voting. However, this latter strand of research has focused on the mainstream left, occasionally studied the radical right, but not paid attention to the radical left.

3. Radical left-parties and their electorates

In contrast to the large literature on RRPs, RLPs have received far less scholarly attention (Fagerholm, 2017: 17; Gomez et al., 2016: 352). As noted by March (2011: 8), the "radical" character of RLPs lies in their opposition to the "socio-economic structure of contemporary capitalism and its values and practices" and their call for "alternative economic and power structures involving a major redistribution of resources from existing political elites." RLPs are primarily "left" in the economic sense: They identify economic inequalities as basic problem of the existing social and political structures, demand more socio-economic rights, and advocate

for a major redistribution of wealth (March, 2011; March and Mudde, 2005; March and Rommerskirchen, 2015). Through their own self-image, RLPs place themselves ideologically to the left of social democratic and green parties (Gomez et al., 2016: 353; March, 2011: 15). While the distinction between RLPs and other non-radical parties of the left-wing party bloc is to some extent gradual (March, 2011: 10), RLPs can be distinguished from other left-wing parties in that they are much more outspoken in their criticism of "neoliberal" capitalism as well their support for wealth redistribution (Fagerholm, 2017: 18; March, 2011: 10). Thus, RLPs have "enough ideological and political coherence to justify being conceptualized as a single party family" (March and Rommerskirchen, 2015: 41).

RLPs are, however, not homogenous. Scholars have therefore proposed various subtypes of RLPs (e.g., Gomez et al., 2016; March, 2011). What is important for our argument is that, whereas RLPs are left-wing on economic issues by definition, RLPs in Western Europe vary in the positions they take on cultural or "New Politics" issues (Gomez et al., 2016: 362). In the two-dimensional space of Figure 1, we thus placed RLP on the far left of the economic dimension, but with variation on the cultural dimension, making them reach into the left-authoritarian quadrant.

While there is a research strand on voting for RLPs (e.g., Beaudonnet and Gomez, 2017; Gomez and Ramiro, 2019; Gomez et al., 2016; Hansen and Olsen, 2021; March and Rommerskirchen, 2015; Ramiro, 2016), none of these studies focus on the connection between party positions and class voting. Previous research has either studied class voting for RLPs or asked how party positions affect their general levels of support.

Regarding the likelihood of different classes to support RLPs, there is no clear consensus. Some studies find a positive association between working-class membership and vote choices for RLPs (Gomez and Ramiro 2019; Ramiro 2016; Rennwald 2020). Yet, Ramiro (2016) also

reports that the effect of identification with the working class varies in strength and direction across countries. Other studies report that RLPs have a second stronghold among socio-cultural professionals, with support as strong (Marchesi, 2022: 8) or even stronger (Ares, 2017: 109) as among (production) workers. Yet in contrast to these findings, Beaudonnet and Gomez (2017) report that manual workers are not more likely to support RLPs, and Wagner (2021) finds no significant effect for any of the Oesch (2006) classes.

Thus, while most studies suggest that RLPs are particularly strong among (production) workers and some that they are also strong among socio-cultural professionals, there is no consensus around these findings. We follow up on the suggestion that class voting varies across contexts and propose that RLPs' positions on the cultural dimension drive this variation. This heterogeneity may, in turn, account for the partly contradictory findings in previous research.

Regarding party positions and voting, two recent studies ask how RLPs' general success at the polls is affected by the positions they take (Krause, 2020; Wagner, 2021). Krause (2020) examines the association between vote shares of RLPs and their positions on the economic and cultural dimension, using macro-level and party platform data. He finds that more moderate party positions on the economic dimension are positively related to the electoral success of RLPs, whereas more moderate positions of RLPs on the cultural dimension are negatively associated with their vote shares. Wagner (2021) combines individual-level data with expert data on party positions and reports a positive association between Eurosceptic positions of RLPs and the propensity to vote for them. As these studies do not consider interactions between social classes and party positions, they might miss that party positions might have opposite effects for different social classes.

We bring these two perspectives together by studying how RLPs' positions affect class voting for RLPs. We focus on the cultural dimension as we expect the relatively large variation on this

dimension to drive differences in class voting. Two classes are of particular interest to our theoretical argument: production workers and socio-cultural professionals. Previous research suggests that these are the two class strongholds of RLPs. Yet, while both of these classes tend to be left-wing on economic issues, they are located at opposite ends of the cultural dimension (see Figure 1). Thus, we expect diametrically opposed reactions to RLPs' cultural positions:

H1: The more authoritarian an RLP's position, the higher the likelihood of production workers to vote for the party.

H2: The more authoritarian an RLP's position, the lower the likelihood of socio-cultural professionals to vote for the party.

We thus hypothesize an authoritarian vs. libertarian class trade-off. For the other classes, the cultural position should make less of a difference. This is for two reasons. First, some of the classes—such as managers and employers—are distant to RLPs on the economic dimension and are unlikely to vote for RLPs no matter their cultural position. Second, the other classes hold less extreme positions on the cultural dimension. For the classes than tend to one side, however, we expect analogous, but less pronounced effects. For example, small-business owners also tend towards authoritarian positions such that these should also be more likely to vote for RLPs with more authoritarian positions, but likely less so than production workers.

4. Data and methods

To test our hypotheses, we use data on individual voters from all nine available waves of the ESS (2020) between 2002 and 2018. As the theoretical arguments so far have mainly referred to Western European politics, the analysis focusses on 12 Western European countries. Based on the existence of a relevant RLP in the system and data availability, we are able to include

Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.

Our dependent variable is based on a question on respondents' voting behavior in the last national election. We code this into an RLP voting dummy. It takes the value of one if individuals indicated to have voted for a (respectively: the most relevant) RLP and the value zero if they indicated to have voted for another party. The selection of RLPs is based on the corresponding party family classification in the CHES trend file (Jolly et al. 2022). Where more than one party has been classified as radical left, we generally selected the most successful party in the respective election. For further details and a full list of the considered parties, see section A in the online appendix. The focus on just one RLP per election allows us to relate voting for this party to its position. In the context of our analysis, it would make little sense to combine voting for different RLPs, who hold different positions, into one dummy variable. Moreover, the focus on the largest RLP ensures a sufficiently large number of voters of these RLPs.

At the individual level, the main independent variable of interest is the class membership of respondents as defined by their occupation. We operationalized occupational classes using a slightly simplified version of the eight-class scheme by Oesch (2006) that distinguishes between seven classes: Socio-cultural professionals, production workers, service workers, technical professionals, clerks, employers & managers[3], and small-business owners.[4] As we are interested in the full class effect, and do not want to block channels through which it may operate, we

[3] To reduce concerns over sparse data cells, we collapsed "managers" and "self-employed professionals & large employers" (2.3% of the sample). Initial analyses showed the two classes to be about equally unlikely to vote for an RLP, no matter its position.

[4] This was done via the Stata syntax provided by Oesch (https://people.unil.ch/danieloesch/scripts/). Respondents who did not have an occupation at the time of the survey were classified by the occupation of their partner, if available.

include only a sparse set of demographic control variables on the individual level in our main regression model, i.e., gender and age.

To these ESS data, we add expert evaluations of these RLPs' positions from the CHES (Jolly et al. 2022), using waves one to six (1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2019). We merge party positions to the ESS data at the election level, as vote choice in the last national election should be a function of party positions in the election years (not of party positions when the ESS was in the field.) To obtain data for each election year, we linearly interpolated values in the CHES data for the missing years in between the waves.

Our main measure of an RLP's cultural policy position is an item on the GAL-TAN dimension. CHES experts were asked to estimate the parties' positions on a scale from zero ("Libertarian/Postmaterialist") to ten ("Traditional/Authoritarian"). This item is well suited to capture the parties' positions on the cultural dimension in its entirety. In contrast to more detailed alternative items, such as a party's position on immigration, it has been included in all waves of the CHES. Yet, we consider alternative measures in additional analyses reported below.

In our final combined dataset, we have 100,264 observations with non-missing values on all the main variables. These are nested in 51 elections, with sample sizes ranging from to 511 to 3,663, from 12 country contexts. Across the 51 elections covered by the ESS question on party choice in the last national election, on average 156 individuals voted for the RLP in question (median: 125). There are just four elections with less than 50 voters of the (relevant) RLP. Thus, our approach results in a sufficient number of RLP voters per context (i.e., election).

Given that party positions are measured at the election level, we estimate hierarchical models with individuals nested in elections. To analyze how class voting varies with party positions, we include a cross-level interaction between class and the respective RLP's cultural position.

To obtain accurate standard errors for the cross-level interaction, we include, in addition to the random intercepts, random slopes for the categorical class variables (Heisig and Schaeffer, 2019). As this makes the model computationally highly demanding particularly in a non-linear model, we run *linear* hierarchical model as our main models. Linear probability models generally approximate well the average marginal effects obtained from binary logistic or probit regressions (Angrist and Pischke, 2009: 107; Wooldridge, 2010: 579). In a robustness check, we show that running a binary logistic model leads to similar results in our application as well.[5]

5. Results

We present our results in three sections. We begin with descriptive results, then move to our main regression results, and end with results from robustness checks.

5.1 Descriptive results

To validate our assumptions, we show results on social classes' (mean) positions as well as RLPs' positions in the two-dimensional policy space in Figure 2. Unsurprisingly, the results for social classes mirror those reported in Figure 1 on the basis of Oesch and Rennwald (2018). In particular, socio-cultural professionals and production workers are both relatively left-wing regarding redistribution, but located on opposite ends of the observed positions on the cultural dimension.

[5] Note that the categorical class variable results in six random slope parameters to be estimated. Specifying our main regression as a binary logistic model, model convergence took about two weeks using Stata/MP 4 (postestimation commands not included). Thus, it is not practicable to choose the logistic model as a baseline, to be used for several robustness checks.

Figure 2: Positions of RLPs on the economic and cultural dimension



Note: The left-hand plot shows mean positions on the two dimensions by social classes based on the ESS. Economic position measured via attitudes towards "governments should redistribute differences in income levels"; cultural positions measured by mean of attitudes towards "gays and lesbians should be free to live life as they wish" and "country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants"; scales recoded to range from 0 to 10. The right-hand plot shows mean expert placements from the CHES (for the election years included in the empirical analysis). In Figure A2 in the online appendix, we zoom in on the RLPs, labelling the individual parties.

As the right-hand side of Figure 2 shows, all RLPs are characterized by staunchly left-wing economic positions, but differ substantially regarding their cultural positions. The standard deviation is twice as high on the cultural compared to the economic dimension (1.30 vs 0.63). Some of the RLPs, such as the Spanish Podemos, hold strongly libertarian positions, others, such as the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) or the Dutch Socialist Party (SP) are located at the center or even fall towards the authoritarian side. Thus, there is sufficient variance in RLPs cultural positions, while economic differences within the RLP family are relatively negligible.

Next, we approach the relation between class voting and RLPs' positions from a descriptive perspective. In Figure 3, we present scatterplots that relate differences in RLP support across classes (y-axis) to RLPs' positions on the cultural dimension (x-axis). More precisely, the x-axis of both panels shows the GAL-TAN positions for the 51 elections covered by our dataset. For the y-axes, we computed, for each election, the percentage point difference of the vote

shares the respective RLP received in two class groups that we expect to react in opposite ways to more authoritarian positions. In the left-hand panel, we look at the two classes our two hypotheses focus on and subtracted support among socio-cultural professionals from support among production workers.

Figure 3: Cultural positions of RLPs and class differences in voting



Note: The y-axis displays the percentage point difference in vote shares between social classes.

The results reveal a pattern in line with our expectations: The more authoritarian an RLP's position, the higher tends to be the support it receives among production workers relative to the support it receives among socio-cultural professionals. For the right-hand panel, we use the broader categories of (skilled and unskilled) workers and the higher-grade service class from Oesch's 5-class scheme. These might be less prone to noisy results emerging from a small number of observations per election and class. Again, the pattern is in line with our expectations: RLPs with very libertarian positions tend to receive higher vote shares within the

higher-grade service class than among workers; in contrast, RLPs with more centrist positions tend to receive relatively more votes from workers.

5.2 Main regression results

In Table 1, we present the results from our regression analysis. Our main model, including the cross-level interactions between classes and RLPs' GAL-TAN positions, is displayed in column 1. From the interaction terms, we can infer that compared to the reference category of socio-cultural professionals all classes—except for technical professionals—react significantly different to more authoritarian GAL-TAN positions. The more authoritarian an RLP's position, the higher the likelihood that small business owners, employers & managers, clerks, service workers, and production workers vote for an RLP, relative to socio-cultural professionals. The interaction term is largest for production workers, indicating that these differ most from socio-cultural professionals in how they react to RLPs' GAL-TAN positions.

Table 1: Main regression models

	(1)	(2)	(3)
female	-0.0027	-0.0027	-0.041
	(0.0018)	(0.0018)	(0.027)
age/100	0.14***	0.14***	0.025***
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.0046)
(age/100)²	-0.17***	-0.17***	-0.00031***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.000044)
social classes (ref.: socio-cult. professionals)			
prod. workers	-0.073***	-0.074***	-1.03***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.20)
serv. workers	-0.051***	-0.053***	-0.65***
	(0.0095)	(0.0089)	(0.13)
tech. professionals	-0.038**	-0.039***	-0.49**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.17)
clerks	-0.062***	-0.062***	-0.83***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.16)
employers & managers	-0.076***	-0.077***	-1.17***
	(0.0095)	(0.0093)	(0.16)
small bus. owners	-0.093***	-0.094***	-1.59***
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.16)
GAL-TAN position	-0.0054		-0.035

	(0.0037)		(0.058)
social classes X GAL-TAN position			
prod. workers X position	0.017***	0.018***	0.25***
	(0.0039)	(0.0038)	(0.056)
serv. workers X position	0.0096***	0.010***	0.12***
	(0.0028)	(0.0026)	(0.037)
tech. professionals X position	0.0019	0.0023	0.021
	(0.0036)	(0.0034)	(0.050)
clerks X position	0.0094**	0.0094**	0.12**
	(0.0033)	(0.0031)	(0.046)
employers & managers X pos.	0.0088**	0.0089**	0.14**
	(0.0028)	(0.0027)	(0.046)
small bus. owners X position	0.012***	0.012***	0.21***
	(0.0030)	(0.0030)	(0.043)
constant	0.10***	0.023*	-2.53***
	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.23)
random effect standard deviations			
intercept	0.026***	fixed effect	0.23***
prod. workers	0.0088***	0.025***	0.15***
serv. workers	0.012***	0.0000043	0.010
tech. professionals	0.015***	0.0087***	0.021
clerks	0.010***	0.012***	0.037
employers & managers	0.013***	0.0093***	0.051*
small bus. owners	0.028***	0.014***	0.017
observations			
elections	51	51	51
individuals	100,264	100,264	100,264
BIC	12828.72	13192.38	50776.04

Note: Regression coefficients (with standard errors) from hierarchical models with individuals nested in elections. Models 1 and 2 are linear (probability) models. Model 3 is a binary logistic regression. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

In Figure 4, we show predicted probabilities and marginal effects to better evaluate these interactions. The upper panels concentrate on the two classes of socio-cultural professionals and production workers. The predicted probability plot in the upper-left corner shows that the more authoritarian an RLP's position, the more likely it becomes that production workers vote for the party. For every scale point that an RLP tends more towards the authoritarian side, production workers become 1.2 percentage points more likely to vote for it (p=0.009). The predicted probability of a production worker to vote for the RLP is about twice as high for the most authoritarian compared to the most libertarian RLPs observed in the sample. In contrast, the line is downward sloping for socio-cultural professionals: Socio-cultural professionals tend to become less supportive of an RLP when it is more authoritarian: The predicted probability

is 11.3% for an RLP with a decisively libertarian position of 1 and 8.6% for an RLP with a position of 6 that tends towards the authoritarian side. The line is less steep than for production workers, however, and the conditional effect of the GAL-TAN position fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance ($p=0.14$). Thus, there is only tentative support for H2.

The most robust conclusions we can draw on the basis of our observational data pertain to the relative difference in vote probabilities between the two classes. In the upper-right corner of Figure 4 we contrast the two predicted probabilities. This is equivalent to the marginal effect of being a production worker (relative to the reference category of socio-cultural professionals) for different values of the GAL-TAN positions. The marginal effect is negative for parties with a strongly libertarian profile. The two classes are about equally likely to vote for RLPs with centrist positions on the cultural dimensions. When it comes to the most authoritarian parties observed in our sample, production workers are statistically significantly more likely to vote for them. Thus, the difference between being a production worker vs. being a socio-cultural professional reverses its sign, depending on RLP's GAL-TAN positions.

Figure 4: Predicted probability of an RLP vote across GAL-TAN positions



Note: The panels in the upper-left corner and in the bottom display average predicted probabilities from hierarchical linear probability models with 85% confidence intervals. We show 85% confidence intervals as their non-overlap approximates better for a statistically significant difference with $p<0.05$. The panel in the upper-right corner shows the difference in the average predicted probability between production workers and socio-cultural professionals with 95% confidence intervals. Histograms in the bottom show the distribution of observed GAL-TAN positions.

In the lower part of Figure 4, we plot predicted probabilities for the other five classes. In the bottom-left quadrant, we contrast small business owners and technical professionals, who—like production workers vs. socio-cultural professionals—also differ in their cultural policy positions. According to Figure 2, small business owners are almost as authoritarian as

production workers; whereas technical professionals are relatively libertarian, though not as libertarian as socio-cultural professionals. We would thus expect a similar, though less pronounced difference—and this is what we find. Small business owners become significantly more likely to vote for RLPs ($p>0.10$), the more authoritarian the parties' position, yet, if anything, the probability decreases among technical professionals. Notwithstanding similar slopes, support is generally at a lower level among small business owners compared to production workers and among technical professionals compared to socio-cultural professionals—which is in line with these two classes' relatively more distant positions on the cultural dimension. The slopes among service workers, clerks, and employers & managers in the bottom-right fall in between. The slopes are all positive but less step as compared to production workers, and the corresponding marginal effects of the GAL-TAN position do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Overall, Figure 4 shows that RLPs may reach their highest support, with predicted probabilities in the double digits, among either socio-cultural professionals or production workers.

In sum, our results indicate that more authoritarian positions of RLPs attract (especially) production workers, but seemingly at the cost of repelling socio-cultural professionals. While the evidence is stronger for the former and somewhat weaker for the latter, it is clear that relative differences in party support covary with GAL-TAN positions: The more authoritarian RLPs' positions, the higher the support among production workers relative to socio-cultural professionals.

5.3 Results from robustness checks and additional models

We performed a number of additional checks to further explore our main finding and probe its robustness. First, as an alternative to our main random-intercept, random-slope model, we

estimated the model with dummies for elections, i.e., election fixed effects instead of the random intercept (see model 3 in Table 1 and Figure C1 in the online appendix). We thus control for any unobserved confounder that might lead to differences in levels of RLP support across elections. In this model, we can no longer include the constituent term of the GAL-TAN position as it is perfectly collinear with the country dummies. However, we can still include the interaction terms, identifying them purely from within election variation in vote choice across classes. This is arguably an even cleaner specification—though it allows only inferences on how RLPs' positions affect relative not absolute levels of support for RLPs. As can be seen in Table 1 and Figure C1, the results on the interaction terms and the marginal difference between production workers and socio-cultural professionals are virtually identical to our main specification.

Second, we estimated our main model via binary logit, which resulted in similar findings as the linear probability model (see model 4 in Table 1 and Figure C2 in the online appendix).

Third, to ensure that our results are not driven by a single country or outlier, we re-estimated our main model while excluding each country in turn (see Table C1 in the online appendix). The interaction between the GAL-TAN position and production workers is always statistically significant with at least $p<0.01$ (and for service workers and small business owners with at least $p<0.05$).

Fourth, while we have seen in Figure 1 that there is much more variance in RLPs cultural than their economic positions, we nonetheless wondered whether our results hold up when accounting for variation in economic party positions. We thus ran a model including an additional cross-level interaction between class and RLP's economic position (see Table C2, Figure C3 and Figure C4 in the online appendix). While these models do indicate that socio-cultural professionals also prefer RLPs with less extremely left-wing positions on the economic

dimensions, our main findings on differences in relative support across the cultural dimension remained similar.

Fifth, we expected to obtain similar results for formal education: As the highly educated typically hold more libertarian positions than the lower educated, RLPs with more authoritarian positions should receive relatively fewer votes from the highly educated and relatively more votes from the lower educated. The results, in section D of the online appendix, are similar to those for the occupational classes: RLPs with strongly libertarian positions are more likely to be chosen by the higher educated; RLPs which tend towards the authoritarian side are more likely be chosen by the lower educated.

Sixth, one may wonder how robust the findings are to using alternative measures of parties' cultural policy positions and whether it is specific issues from the cultural dimension that matter for class voting. We explore this in section E of the online appendix, using a set of more detailed items included in the CHES from 2006 onward. This means that we can only include a subset of the initial election-level observations, i.e., 34 instead of 51. In a first step, we verified that the GAL-TAN item loads strongly on a composite factor score computed from six single items (=0.95; see Table E1). Generally, the single items are highly correlated even if we only look at the RLPs only (see Table E2). In a next step, we estimated (separate) regressions with a composite mean index as well as the five additional items (see Table E3) and plotted predicted probabilities and marginal effects (see Figures E2 to E7). The results are similar across the measure. The interaction between production workers and each position measure is statistically significant with at least $p<0.05$. The model fit, as indicated by the lowest Bayesian information criterion (BIC), is best for the mean index. We conclude that there is no single measure that

stands out, rather what seems to matter is a general stance on the cultural dimension (which is well captured by the GAL-TAN item).[6]

6. Conclusion

This study has reported evidence for a class trade-off associated with the positions RLPs take on the cultural policy dimension. Less libertarian positions of RLPs are associated with more support from production workers but tend to go along with decreased support from socio-cultural professionals. Given that general levels of support for RLPs may be influenced by a host of factors, the most robust conclusions we can draw on the basis of our observational data pertain to the relative pattern: More authoritarian positions are associated with relatively more support from production workers as compared to socio-cultural professionals. This pattern is not driven by a single country, it holds for various measures of RLPs' cultural position and replicates for education.

Still, our study is, of course, not without limitations. By focusing on RLPs positions, our account has abstracted from other features that may also affect class voting for RLPs—such as the salience of issues, be it at the system level or in the emphasis that RLPs put on different issue dimensions; how electoral competitors of RLPs are positioned, be it the mainstream left or the radical right; or symbolic group-based appeals via which parties may also differentially attract support from class groups. Future research may incorporate these additional features. A particular thorny issue is the possibility of the reversed causality: Is it party positions that shape

[6] However, the results are different regarding party positions on European integration (see model 7 in Table E1 and Figure E7), which does not load as well with the other "cultural" items. More Eurosceptic positions are not associated with more support from production workers relative to socio-cultural professionals. However, technical professionals are more likely than small business owners to vote for RLPs with moderate positions on European integration—a gap which disappears with more pronounced Eurosceptic positions.

support among different classes, or is it relative levels of support from different classes that shape how RLPs position themselves? At least in its radical version the reverse causality charge seems unlikely to be true, in that it would imply that parties strategically position themselves with respect to what they class support base is but that this positioning in turn does not affect class voting. It seems more likely that both processes mutually reinforce each other, which means that causality will remain hard to disentangle.

These limitations notwithstanding, our findings demonstrate that the class trade-offs suggested for the radical left are real. Given the increased salience of questions around immigration and multiculturalism and the heterogenous positions of classes from which they receive disproportionate support on these issues, RLPs seem not, or at least no longer, be able to escape the electoral dilemmas associated with taking a stance on these cultural issues in one direction or the other. However, it should be pointed out that, given the observed distributions of RLPs' positions on the cultural dimension, the variation we are talking about is RLPs taking either very libertarian stances or rather centrist positions on the cultural dimension.

By showing that cultural policy positions shape class voting for RLPs, we add to previous evidence on the top-down nature of class voting—which has focused on the mainstream left at the expense of the radical left, and mainly studied economic policy positions. Our results may be able to reconcile conflicting evidence from previous studies on how cultural positions affect class voting for left parties. While Abou-Chadi and Wagner (2020) find that mainstream left parties with more authoritarian positions do not attract more support from workers, Angelucci and Vittori (2021) report that manual workers are less likely to vote for an "old" left party when these parties adopt more libertarian positions. While we make no explicit comparison to the mainstream left, our results suggest that RLPs may be in a better position to attract working-class support through more authoritarian positions. How they resolve this trade-off may matter

for the vote share of the left-wing bloc as a whole, which may increase when different parties of the left appeal to different (class) segments (cf. Hjorth and Larsen 2022).

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Online Appendix

to

Cultural positions of radical-left parties and class voting:

The libertarian vs. authoritarian trade-off in Western Europe

Appendix A: Included parties

Table A1: List of included parties with number of voters

Country	Election	RLP label	RLP full name	Voters in ESS	Vote share in ESS	Actual vote share
BE	2010	PvdA	Partij van de Arbeid van België (Parti du Travail de Belgique)	23	0.9%	0.8%
BE	2014	PvdA	Partij van de Arbeid van België (Parti du Travail de Belgique)	124	3.4%	3.7%
DE	2002	LINKE/PDS	Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus	290	7.8%	4.0%
DE	2005	LINKE/PDS	Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus	334	9.5%	8.7%
DE	2009	LINKE/PDS	Die Linke	362	9.7%	11.9%
DE	2013	LINKE/PDS	Die Linke	415	10.5%	8.7%
DE	2017	LINKE/PDS	Die Linke	125	7.7%	9.2%
DK	2001	SF	Socialistisk Folkeparti	197	8.2%	6.4%
DK	2005	SF	Socialistisk Folkeparti	106	8.5%	6.0%
DK	2007	SF	Socialistisk Folkeparti	382	14.9%	13.0%
DK	2011	SF	Socialistisk Folkeparti	249	9.9%	9.2%
DK	2015	SF	Socialistisk Folkeparti	73	5.9%	4.2%
ES	2000	IU	Izquierda Unida	49	5.3%	5.5 %
ES	2004	IU	Izquierda Unida	112	5.5%	5.0%
ES	2008	IU	Izquierda Unida	118	4.7%	3.8%
ES	2011	IU	Izquierda Unida	189	8.6%	6.9%
ES	2016	PODEMOS	Podemos	329	15.1%	21.2%
FI	1999	VAS	Vasemmistoliitto	84	6.9%	10.9%
FI	2003	VAS	Vasemmistoliitto	143	5.6%	9.9%
FI	2007	VAS	Vasemmistoliitto	152	6.0%	8.8%
FI	2011	VAS	Vasemmistoliitto	189	6.7%	8.1%
FI	2015	VAS	Vasemmistoliitto	136	5.3%	7.1%
FR	2002	PFC/FDG	Parti communiste français	120	4.1%	4.4%
FR	2007	PFC/FDG	Parti communiste français	73	3.4%	4.3%
FR	2012	PFC/FDG	Front de Gauche	145	4.4%	6.9%
FR	2017	FI	La France Insoumise	78	8.3%	11.0%
GR	2000	KKE	Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas	73	5.3%	5.5%
GR	2004	KKE	Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas	68	5.0%	5.9%
GR	2007	KKE	Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas	124	9.5%	8.2%
GR	2009	KKE	Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas	114	9.4%	7.5%
IT	2001	RC	Rifondazione Comunista	35	5.9%	5.0%
IT	2013	RC	Rivoluzione Civile	17	1.2%	2.2%
NL	2002	SP	Socialistische Partij	129	6.7%	5.9%
NL	2003	SP	Socialistische Partij	108	7.7%	6.3%
NL	2006	SP	Socialistische Partij	294	10.5%	16.6%
NL	2010	SP	Socialistische Partij	133	9.4%	9.8%
NL	2012	SP	Socialistische Partij	390	9.9%	9.7%

NL	2017	SP	Socialistische Partij	94	7.8%	9.1%
NO	2009	SV	Sosialistisk Venstreparti	165	7.1%	6.2%
NO	2013	SV	Sosialistisk Venstreparti	110	4.9%	4.1%
NO	2017	SV	Sosialistisk Venstreparti	98	8.9%	6.0%
PT	2002	CDU	Coligação Democrática Unitária (Partido Comunista Português-Partido Ecologista Os Verdes)	123	7.3%	6.9%
PT	2005	CDU	Coligação Democrática Unitária (Partido Comunista Português-Partido Ecologista Os Verdes)	158	7.2%	7.5%
PT	2009	CDU	Coligação Democrática Unitária (Partido Comunista Português-Partido Ecologista Os Verdes)	54	5.7%	7.9%
PT	2011	CDU	Coligação Democrática Unitária (Partido Comunista Português-Partido Ecologista Os Verdes)	131	9.0%	7.9%
PT	2015	CDU	Coligação Democrática Unitária (Partido Comunista Português-Partido Ecologista Os Verdes)	90	6.9%	8.3%
SE	2002	V	Vänsterpartiet	270	9.0%	8.4%
SE	2006	V	Vänsterpartiet	154	5.3%	5.9%
SE	2010	V	Vänsterpartiet	135	5.1%	5.6%
SE	2014	V	Vänsterpartiet	167	6.2%	5.7%
SE	2018	V	Vänsterpartiet	125	9.5%	8.0%

Note: The table shows the RLPs we considered for the analysis.

The selection of RLPs is based on the corresponding party family classification in the CHES trend file (Jolly et al. 2022). As no CHES party family classification is available for Norway, we followed the classification in the ParlGov database in this case. Where more than one party has been classified as "radical left", we generally selected the most successful party in the respective election. For the Greek elections (in 2000, 2005, 2007 and 2009) this means that KKE is selected, not Syriza. In the case of Portugal, CDU is chosen due to data availability. Where parties changed names or (temporarily) competed in electoral alliances (e.g., IU/Podemos in Spain) the position of the combined list or new party is taken into account. If that was not possible, the position of the original party is used.

As explained in the main text, we merge party positions to the ESS data at the election level. To obtain data for each election year, we linearly interpolated values in the CHES data for the missing years in between the waves. Note that we extrapolated data for party positions for four elections. For the Norwegian SV, we only have CHES observations for 2010 and 2014 and we linearly extrapolated those to obtain information for 2009 and 2017. The Danish SF is last covered in the CHES in 2014 and we extrapolated to 2015. "France Insoumise" was covered in the CHES for 2019 for the first time and we used these data to measure its position in the 2017 French national election.

Figure A2: Positions of included RLPs in the two-dimensional policy space



Note: Mean expert placements from the CHES. Positions are plotted for the election years included in the empirical analysis. Both scales have a theoretical range from zero to ten.

Appendix B: Additional descriptive information

Figure B1: Distribution of occupational classes by country



Appendix C: Robustness checks for baseline model

Figure C1: Marginal effect of production worker from fixed-intercept, random-slope model (Table 1, model 3)



Note: The figure shows differences in the average predicted probability to vote for the respective RLP between production workers and socio-cultural professionals with 95% confidence intervals. Histograms in the bottom show the distribution of observed GAL-TAN positions. Estimations based on model 3 in Table 1 of the main text.

Figure C2: Cultural positions of RLPs and differences in voting across classes from binary logistic regression



Note: The panels in the upper-left corner and in the bottom display average predicted probabilities from hierarchical linear probability models. The panel in the upper-right corner shows the difference in the average predicted probability between production workers and socio-cultural. Confidence intervals omitted for computational reasons (i.e., because estimations takes too long after binary logit with random slopes and over 100,000 observations) Histograms in the bottom of each plot show the distribution of observed GAL-TAN positions. Estimations based on model 3 in Table 1 of the main text.

Table C1: Regressions with single countries excluded

	BE	DE	DK	ES	FI	FR	GR	IT	NL	NO	PT
female	-0.0024	-0.000052	-0.0058**	-0.0019	-0.0036+	-0.0013	-0.0016	-0.0028	-0.0042*	-0.0049**	-0.00045
	(0.0019)	(0.0019)	(0.0018)	(0.0018)	(0.0019)	(0.0019)	(0.0018)	(0.0018)	(0.0019)	(0.0018)	(0.0018)
age/100	0.13***	0.13***	0.097**	0.16***	0.15***	0.14***	0.13***	0.14***	0.10***	0.15***	0.14***
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
(age/100)²	-0.17***	-0.18***	-0.13***	-0.18***	-0.19***	-0.17***	-0.17***	-0.17***	-0.14***	-0.18***	-0.17***
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
social classes (ref.: socio-cult. professionals)											
prod. workers	-0.076***	-0.074***	-0.051***	-0.071***	-0.086***	-0.070***	-0.077***	-0.076***	-0.083***	-0.059***	-0.080***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)
serv. workers	-0.054***	-0.056***	-0.034***	-0.052***	-0.060***	-0.048***	-0.049***	-0.054***	-0.058***	-0.042***	-0.060***
	(0.0099)	(0.0095)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.0096)	(0.0099)	(0.010)	(0.0098)	(0.010)	(0.0098)	(0.0097)
tech. professionals	-0.042***	-0.036**	-0.014	-0.061***	-0.043***	-0.035**	-0.035**	-0.039**	-0.047***	-0.029*	-0.043***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
clerks	-0.067***	-0.067***	-0.037**	-0.074***	-0.072***	-0.059***	-0.058***	-0.066***	-0.064***	-0.053***	-0.067***
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
employers & managers	-0.081***	-0.076***	-0.057***	-0.078***	-0.085***	-0.073***	-0.073***	-0.082***	-0.089***	-0.072***	-0.081***
	(0.0099)	(0.0098)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.0098)	(0.0100)	(0.0099)	(0.0093)	(0.010)	(0.0099)
small bus. owners	-0.100***	-0.095***	-0.069***	-0.091***	-0.10***	-0.089***	-0.086***	-0.098***	-0.10***	-0.088***	-0.099***
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
GAL-TAN position	-0.0071*	-0.0079*	0.00022	-0.0035	-0.0066+	-0.0031	-0.0042	-0.0077*	-0.011**	-0.0037	-0.0063
	(0.0035)	(0.0040)	(0.0035)	(0.0037)	(0.0038)	(0.0037)	(0.0043)	(0.0037)	(0.0041)	(0.0038)	(0.0039)
social classes X GAL-TAN position											
prod. workers X position	0.018***	0.019***	0.013**	0.017***	0.018***	0.016***	0.019***	0.018***	0.022***	0.014***	0.019***
	(0.0040)	(0.0042)	(0.0040)	(0.0044)	(0.0032)	(0.0041)	(0.0045)	(0.0040)	(0.0043)	(0.0039)	(0.0040)
serv. workers X position	0.010***	0.012***	0.0058*	0.0096**	0.010***	0.0083**	0.0087**	0.010***	0.012***	0.0074**	0.012***
	(0.0029)	(0.0029)	(0.0029)	(0.0031)	(0.0028)	(0.0029)	(0.0031)	(0.0029)	(0.0032)	(0.0028)	(0.0028)
tech. professionals X position	0.0027	0.0013	-0.0036	0.0082*	0.0022	0.00073	0.00092	0.0020	0.0057	-0.00035	0.0031
	(0.0037)	(0.0040)	(0.0035)	(0.0035)	(0.0038)	(0.0039)	(0.0038)	(0.0037)	(0.0041)	(0.0038)	(0.0037)
clerks X position	0.010**	0.012***	0.0043	0.012***	0.011**	0.0082*	0.0078*	0.010**	0.010**	0.0073*	0.010**
	(0.0034)	(0.0033)	(0.0033)	(0.0035)	(0.0034)	(0.0035)	(0.0036)	(0.0034)	(0.0037)	(0.0033)	(0.0034)
employers & managers X posit.	0.0098***	0.0087**	0.0047	0.0091**	0.0100***	0.0075**	0.0075*	0.010***	0.014***	0.0077**	0.0098***
	(0.0028)	(0.0030)	(0.0028)	(0.0030)	(0.0029)	(0.0029)	(0.0030)	(0.0029)	(0.0029)	(0.0029)	(0.0029)
small bus. owners X position	0.013***	0.014***	0.0066*	0.011***	0.013***	0.0098**	0.0089**	0.013***	0.016***	0.010***	0.013***
	(0.0030)	(0.0032)	(0.0028)	(0.0032)	(0.0031)	(0.0030)	(0.0034)	(0.0031)	(0.0033)	(0.0031)	(0.0031)
constant	0.11***	0.11***	0.083***	0.084***	0.11***	0.095***	0.098***	0.11***	0.12***	0.090***	0.10***
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)
random effect standard deviations											
intercept	0.027***	0.028***	0.027***	0.027***	0.016***	0.028***	0.026***	0.027***	0.027***	0.025***	0.026***
prod. workers	0.0090***	0.0083***	0.0098***	0.0093***	0.0068***	0.0095***	0.0086***	0.0087***	0.011***	0.0065***	0.0081***
serv. workers	0.012***	0.013***	0.0088***	0.0000050***	0.012***	0.013***	0.012***	0.011***	0.013***	0.013***	0.012***
tech. professionals	0.015***	0.011***	0.014***	0.012***	0.014***	0.016***	0.014***	0.015***	0.015***	0.014***	0.016***
clerks	0.010***	0.011***	0.010***	0.010***	0.011***	0.011***	0.010***	0.010***	0.0042***	0.011***	0.011***
employers & managers	0.012***	0.016***	0.0098***	0.011***	0.014***	0.012***	0.012***	0.013***	0.014***	0.014***	0.015***
small bus. owners	0.026***	0.030***	0.025***	0.025***	0.029***	0.028***	0.029***	0.028***	0.029***	0.029***	0.030***

observations											
elections	49	46	46	46	46	47	47	49	45	48	46
individuals	94815	84784	90874	91937	89113	91680	95710	98547	88472	94990	93614
BIC	15624.36	6812.37	8494.641	10951.9	13287.05	14693.11	12099.04	13666.22	8569.645	12526.45	11894.73

Note: Regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) from hierarchical linear (probability) models with individuals nested in elections. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table C2: Regressions with additional interaction between class and economic party position

	(2)
female	-0.0028
	(0.0018)
age/100	0.14***
	(0.029)
(age/100)²	-0.17***
	(0.027)
social classes (ref.: socio-cult. professionals)	
prod. workers	-0.044*
	(0.019)
serv. workers	-0.024
	(0.015)
tech. professionals	0.018
	(0.017)
clerks	-0.016
	(0.016)
employers & managers	-0.028*
	(0.014)
small bus. owners	-0.024+
	(0.014)
GAL-TAN position	-0.00039
	(0.0036)
Economic left-right position	0.037***
	(0.0075)
social classes X GAL-TAN position	
prod. workers X GAL-TAN position	0.015***
	(0.0040)
serv. workers X GAL-TAN position	0.0079**
	(0.0029)
tech. professionals X GAL-TAN position	-0.0020
	(0.0035)
clerks X GAL-TAN position	0.0060+
	(0.0034)
employers & managers X GAL-TAN pos.	0.0053+
	(0.0028)
small bus. owners X GAL-TAN position	0.0061*
	(0.0029)
social classes X economic position	
prod. workers X economic position	-0.017*
	(0.0082)
serv. workers X economic position	-0.016**
	(0.0062)
tech. professionals X economic position	-0.033***
	(0.0071)
clerks X economic position	-0.027***
	(0.0071)
employers & managers X economic pos.	-0.028***

	(0.0059)
small bus. owners X economic position	-0.040***
	(0.0061)
constant	0.036+
	(0.019)
random effect standard deviations	
intercept	0.025***
prod. workers	0.0087***
serv. workers	0.0089***
tech. professionals	0.014***
clerks	0.0096***
employers & managers	0.0079***
small bus. owners	0.026***
observations	
elections	51
individuals	100,264
BIC	12853.5

Note: Regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) from hierarchical linear (probability) model with individuals nested in elections. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Figure C2: Cultural positions of RLPs and differences in voting across classes with additional control for economic position of RLP



Note: The panels in the upper-left corner and in the bottom display average predicted probabilities from hierarchical linear probability models with 85% confidence intervals. The panel in the upper-right corner shows the difference in the average predicted probability between production workers and socio-cultural professionals with 95% confidence intervals. Histograms in the bottom of each plot show the distribution of observed GAL-TAN positions. Estimations based on model 1 in Table C2.

Figure C3: Economic positions of RLPs and differences in voting across classes



Note: The panels in the upper-left corner and in the bottom display average predicted probabilities from hierarchical linear probability models with 85% confidence intervals. The panel in the upper-right corner shows the difference in the average predicted probability between production workers and socio-cultural professionals with 95% confidence intervals. Histograms in the bottom of each plot show the distribution of observed GAL-TAN positions. Estimations based on model 1 in Table C2.

Appendix D: Results for education

Figure D1: Cultural positions of RLPs and differences in voting across education groups



Note: The y-axis displays the percentage point difference in vote shares across educational groups. This is computed as percent of those with tertiary education completed voting for the RLP minus percent of those with less than lower and of those with completed secondary education voting for the RLP. There is a clear tendency of RLPs to receive relatively higher support among the lower educated the more authoritarian its position.

Table D1: Regression models for education

	(1)	(2)
female	0.00087	0.00091
	(0.0016)	(0.0016)
age/100	0.084**	0.083**
	(0.027)	(0.027)
(age/100)²	-0.13***	-0.13***
	(0.025)	(0.025)
education (ref.: tertiary education)		
upper secondary & post-secondary	-0.033***	-0.033***
	(0.0092)	(0.0088)
(less than) lower secondary	-0.041***	-0.041***
	(0.012)	(0.012)
GAL-TAN position	-0.0035	
	(0.0038)	
education X GAL-TAN position		
upper secondary & post-secondary	0.0085**	0.0084**
	(0.0027)	(0.0026)
(less than) lower secondary	0.011**	0.011**
	(0.0036)	(0.0036)
constant	0.083***	0.0055
	(0.015)	(0.010)
random effect standard deviations		
intercept	0.018***	fixed effect
upper secondary & post-secondary	0.028***	0.017***
(less than) lower secondary	0.033***	0.028***
observations		
elections	51	51
individuals	108,988	108,988
BIC	14055.39	14424.58

Note: Regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) from hierarchical models with individuals nested in elections. Models 1 and 2 are linear (probability) models. Model 3 is a binary logistic regression. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Figure D2: Predicted probability and marginal effect of an RLP vote across GAL-TAN positions for education



Note: The upper panels display average predicted probabilities from hierarchical linear probability models with 85% confidence intervals. The panel in the lower part shows the difference in the average predicted probability between the low educated ((less than) lower secondary) and the high educated (tertiary education) with 95% confidence intervals. Calculations are based on model 1 of Table D1.

Appendix E: Results for other party position measures

Table E1: Factor analysis of party position items

Variable	Loading	Uniqueness
GAL vs. TAN	0.95	0.10
Civil liberties vs. law & order	0.96	0.08
Social lifestyle	0.91	0.17
Immigration policy	0.96	0.09
Multiculturalism	0.95	0.10
Ethnic minorities	0.95	0.10

Note: The table shows factor loadings from a principal component factor analysis based on data from the CHES. Included are all parties from the 12 Western European countries included in the study. Factor has an eigenvalue: 5.36 of and explains 0.894 of the variance in the individual items.

Table E2: Correlation between party position measures

	GAL vs. TAN	Cultural mean index	Civil liberties vs. law & order	Social lifestyle	Immigration policy	Multiculturalism	Ethnic minorities	EU integration	Economic left-right
GAL vs. TAN	1.00								
Cultural mean index	0.83	1.00							
Civil liberties vs. law & order	0.70	0.91	1.00						
Social lifestyle	0.64	0.75	0.58	1.00					
Immigration policy	0.63	0.86	0.81	0.39	1.00				
Multiculturalism	0.60	0.87	0.79	0.46	0.85	1.00			
Ethnic minorities	0.61	0.90	0.87	0.66	0.76	0.79	1.00		
EU integration	0.53	0.32	0.21	0.51	0.02	0.17	0.13	1.00	
Economic left-right	-0.34	-0.06	0.15	-0.32	0.16	-0.05	0.20	-0.64	1.00

Note: Pairwise Pearson correlations. Included are only the analyzed RLPs.

Table E3: Regressions with alternative position items

	(1) Cultural mean index	(2) Civil liberties vs. law & order	(3) Social lifestyle	(4) Immigration policy	(5) Multi-culturalism	(6) Ethnic minorities	(7) EU integration
female	-0.0028	-0.0028	-0.0028	-0.0028	-0.0028	-0.0028	-0.0049**
	(0.0021)	(0.0021)	(0.0021)	(0.0021)	(0.0021)	(0.0021)	(0.0018)
age/100	0.11**	0.11**	0.11**	0.11**	0.11**	0.11**	0.15***
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.030)
(age/100)²	-0.16***	-0.16***	-0.16***	-0.16***	-0.16***	-0.16***	-0.18***
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.028)
social classes (ref.: socio-cult. professionals)							
prod. workers	-0.076***	-0.069***	-0.050***	-0.053***	-0.062***	-0.072***	-0.026
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.024)
serv. workers	-0.053***	-0.049***	-0.045***	-0.033***	-0.045***	-0.052***	-0.033*
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.0082)	(0.0094)	(0.0095)	(0.013)	(0.016)
tech. professionals	-0.030*	-0.019	-0.038***	-0.021+	-0.035**	-0.029+	-0.017
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.021)
clerks	-0.062***	-0.052***	-0.054***	-0.042***	-0.054***	-0.063***	-0.067***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.0092)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.019)
employers & managers	-0.064***	-0.054***	-0.066***	-0.048***	-0.061***	-0.058***	-0.062***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.0080)	(0.0086)	(0.0091)	(0.012)	(0.017)
small bus. owners	-0.073***	-0.062***	-0.077***	-0.051***	-0.067***	-0.069***	-0.12***
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.0091)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.017)
position	0.0019	0.0042	-0.0031	0.0077+	-0.00049	0.0014	-0.0070
	(0.0057)	(0.0063)	(0.0041)	(0.0045)	(0.0044)	(0.0061)	(0.0045)
social classes X position							
prod. workers X position	0.019***	0.017**	0.012**	0.012*	0.013**	0.017**	0.0027
	(0.0057)	(0.0064)	(0.0044)	(0.0047)	(0.0044)	(0.0063)	(0.0048)
serv. workers X position	0.011**	0.0095*	0.0097**	0.0040	0.0072**	0.0100*	0.0033
	(0.0037)	(0.0040)	(0.0030)	(0.0031)	(0.0027)	(0.0040)	(0.0033)
tech. profess. X position	-0.00048	-0.0041	0.0031	-0.0036	0.0014	-0.00072	-0.0027
	(0.0049)	(0.0053)	(0.0039)	(0.0039)	(0.0035)	(0.0052)	(0.0043)
clerks X position	0.011**	0.0081+	0.011**	0.0045	0.0079**	0.011**	0.0079*
	(0.0041)	(0.0044)	(0.0034)	(0.0032)	(0.0030)	(0.0043)	(0.0039)
employers & manag. X posit.	0.0047	0.0012	0.0065*	-0.00070	0.0034	0.0024	0.0032
	(0.0036)	(0.0038)	(0.0029)	(0.0028)	(0.0026)	(0.0038)	(0.0034)
small bus. owners X position	0.0058	0.0021	0.0087**	-0.0019	0.0033	0.0041	0.013***
	(0.0043)	(0.0047)	(0.0032)	(0.0034)	(0.0032)	(0.0046)	(0.0035)

Constant	0.090***	0.083***	0.10***	0.074***	0.096***	0.091***	0.11***
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.024)
random effect standard deviations							
Intercept	0.028***	0.029***	0.031***	0.029***	0.030***	0.029***	0.027***
prod. workers	0.0079***	0.0080***	0.0096***	0.0100***	0.0089***	0.0083***	0.0080***
serv. Workers	0.015***	0.015***	0.016***	0.016***	0.016***	0.015***	0.012***
tech. professionals	0.011***	0.011***	0.012***	0.012***	0.011***	0.010***	0.012***
Clerks	0.011***	0.011***	0.011***	0.011***	0.011***	0.011***	0.011***
employers & managers	0.015***	0.015***	0.014***	0.014***	0.015***	0.015***	0.011***
small bus. Owners	0.032***	0.033***	0.033***	0.031***	0.033***	0.033***	0.029***
observations							
Elections	34	34	34	34	34	34	48
Individuals	68335	68335	68335	68335	68335	68335	94990
BIC	9103.979	9108.868	9106.376	9109.004	9109.385	9108.604	12530.42

Note: Regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) from hierarchical linear (probability) models with individuals nested in elections. All positions except for EU integration are measured on scales from 0 to 10 with higher values indicating more authoritarian/traditionalist/nativist positions. Position towards European integration is measured on a scale from 1 (strongly in favor) to 7 (strongly opposed); original scale was reversed. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Figure E1: Predicted probability and marginal effect of an RLP vote across cultural positions (mean index)



Note: The panels in the upper-left corner and in the bottom display average predicted probabilities from hierarchical linear probability models with 85% confidence intervals. The panel in the upper-right corner shows the difference in the average predicted probability between production workers and socio-cultural professionals with 95% confidence intervals. Histograms in the bottom of each plot show the distribution of observed GAL-TAN positions. Estimations based on model 1 in Table E3.

Figure E2: Predicted probability and marginal effect of an RLP vote across positions on civil liberties vs. law & order



Note: The panels in the upper-left corner and in the bottom display average predicted probabilities from hierarchical linear probability models with 85% confidence intervals. The panel in the upper-right corner shows the difference in the average predicted probability between production workers and socio-cultural professionals with 95% confidence intervals. Histograms in the bottom of each plot show the distribution of observed GAL-TAN positions. Estimations based on model 2 in Table E3.

Figure E3: Predicted probability and marginal effect of an RLP vote across positions on social lifestyle



Note: The panels in the upper-left corner and in the bottom display average predicted probabilities from hierarchical linear probability models with 85% confidence intervals. The panel in the upper-right corner shows the difference in the average predicted probability between production workers and socio-cultural professionals with 95% confidence intervals. Histograms in the bottom of each plot show the distribution of observed GAL-TAN positions. Estimations based on model 3 in Table E3.

Figure E4: Predicted probability and marginal effect of an RLP vote across positions on immigration policy



Note: The panels in the upper-left corner and in the bottom display average predicted probabilities from hierarchical linear probability models with 85% confidence intervals. The panel in the upper-right corner shows the difference in the average predicted probability between production workers and socio-cultural professionals with 95% confidence intervals. Histograms in the bottom of each plot show the distribution of observed GAL-TAN positions. Estimations based on model 4 in Table E3.

Figure E5: Predicted probability and marginal effect of an RLP vote across positions on multiculturalism



Note: The panels in the upper-left corner and in the bottom display average predicted probabilities from hierarchical linear probability models with 85% confidence intervals. The panel in the upper-right corner shows the difference in the average predicted probability between production workers and socio-cultural professionals with 95% confidence intervals. Histograms in the bottom of each plot show the distribution of observed GAL-TAN positions. Estimations based on model 5 in Table E3.

Figure E6: Predicted probability and marginal effect of an RLP vote across positions on ethnic minorities



Note: The panels in the upper-left corner and in the bottom display average predicted probabilities from hierarchical linear probability models with 85% confidence intervals. The panel in the upper-right corner shows the difference in the average predicted probability between production workers and socio-cultural professionals with 95% confidence intervals. Histograms in the bottom of each plot show the distribution of observed GAL-TAN positions. Estimations based on model 6 in Table E3.

Figure E7: Predicted probability and marginal effect of an RLP vote across positions on EU integration



Note: The panels in the upper-left corner and in the bottom display average predicted probabilities from hierarchical linear probability models with 85% confidence intervals. The panel in the upper-right corner shows the difference in the average predicted probability between production workers and socio-cultural professionals with 95% confidence intervals. Histograms in the bottom of each plot show the distribution of observed GAL-TAN positions. Estimations based on model 7 in Table E3.