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How decision-makers perceive news coverage
and how this impression shapes their
negotiation strategy*

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Does media bias fuel the confrontation? – How decision-makers perceive news coverage and how this impression shapes their negotiation strategy

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Abstract

According to several elite surveys, political decision-makers are quite dissatisfied with media coverage. Following claims raised as part of the mediatization paradigm, this dissatisfaction is assumed to impact their decision-making. However, it remains largely unclear where this dissatisfaction originates from and which facets of media coverage give reason to their critique. Furthermore, we lack empirical evidence that links political decision-makers' differentiated assessment of the media coverage to their actual decision-making. Based on a survey of high-rank decision-makers (N = 326), we shed light on the subjective manner of their evaluation of media coverage and show that journalism is also rated in light of presumed influences and one's own media activities. Additionally, this assessment is associated with their strategic choices in the decision-making process. Here, our results reveal that perceived bias in the coverage about one's own decision-making process is linked to a more competitive strategy, while a perceived lack of accuracy is negatively linked to a compromise-oriented strategy.

Keywords: decision-makers, political news coverage, journalistic quality evaluations, mediatization, negotiations, bargaining strategy

Does media bias fuel the confrontation? – How decision-makers perceive news coverage and how this impression shapes their negotiation strategy

The quality of journalistic media coverage regularly arouses discontent among audiences. Yet, not only ordinary people see their expectations towards journalists and their reporting disappointed from time to time (e.g., Fletcher, 2021). Several elite surveys similarly revealed a high level of dissatisfaction with journalism among societal decision-makers (e.g., Fawzi, 2014; Landerer, 2015). Thus, societal decision-makers who are responsible to find solutions to societal problems in various subfields (e.g., politics, economics) seem to form expectations on journalistic media coverage as well, especially when it comes to the reporting on their own decision-making.

Besides normatively anchored quality criteria (e.g., diversity, relevance, professionalism; Schatz & Schulz, 1992; Strömbäck, 2005), general audience research suggests that it is primarily subjective factors that shape perceptions of journalistic quality (Schmitt, 2016; Jandura & Friedrich, 2014). While general audience research has identified plenty of factors that coin the quality assessments of ordinary recipients (e.g., Loosen et al., 2020), it remains unclear whether these factors determine decision-makers' assessment of media coverage as well. In addition to such subjective experiences, it seems reasonable for elites to assume that factors related to their professional actions such as presumed media influences or the assessment of their own communication performance are important as well (Cohen et al., 2008).

The question of how decision-makers evaluate news coverage seems particularly interesting since it can be assumed that these evaluations also shape their actions (cf. Strömbäck & Esser, 2014, Kepplinger, 2010, Marcinkowski, 2014). Empirically, there is some evidence that various media-related considerations such as the presumed influence affect the decision-making of politicians, judges, or economic leaders (cf. Fawzi, 2018; Kepplinger & Zerback, 2012; Kepplinger, 2010). However, a more differentiated perspective

is still missing: For instance, it is unclear which evaluations of media coverage entail which consequences for their actions. Furthermore, a more comprehensive view combining different aspects of media-related perceptions and considerations represents a gap in political communication research. In fact, a lack of doing so could result in over-/underestimating the effects of specific media-related perceptions. In this study, we want to address these two major gaps with regards to societal decision-makers interplay with journalistic media coverage:

1. What factors shape decision-makers' evaluation of news coverage about their own decision-making?
2. What consequences does this evaluation have for their actions as decision-makers?

By answering these two research questions, our investigation enables a differentiated assessment, not only how societal decision makers evaluate news coverage but also how different aspects of this assessment shape their decision-making. Results of an online survey of high-level decision-makers from the field of industrial relations (N = 326) showed that decision-makers evaluated media coverage on grounds of the perceived public attention, presumed media influence as well as their own media activities. While controlling for central characteristics of the decision-making process, further analyses revealed that the evaluation of media coverage was related to the choice of a specific decision-making strategy.

How societal decision-makers evaluate news coverage

Communication scholars have long been concerned with the question of how news coverage is perceived and evaluated by the audience (Meijer, 2019). As a result, extensive research in this field yielded many insights into audience-related expectations and quality criteria (e.g., Loosen et al., 2020). Recently, research shifted its focus from the audience in general to

various social groups revealing great differences in the perception of media coverage caused by sex, ethnicity and geography (Fletcher, 2021). For societal decision-makers one could also assume a different setting of expectations and perceptions when they evaluate media coverage: Most of them use news media more intensely than ordinary recipients and their news use is guided, at least partly, by other, more professionally-oriented motivations (Walgrave & Dejaeghere, 2017). Accordingly, several elite surveys revealed a rather critical perspective on journalism (e.g., Fawzi, 2014; Landerer, 2015). Following the mediatization paradigm (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014), the question how elites evaluate news coverage is important since their evaluations might not only influence their public communication activities but also their strategic considerations and ultimately also their decisions which are often relevant for large parts of society.

Yet, we know very little about the criteria of elites' critical assessment of media coverage. Research on recipient evaluations of reporting suggests normative quality criteria (e.g. impartiality, objectiveness, relevance, balance or diversity; Bachmann et al., 2022) and subjective factors (Schmitt, 2016; Jandura & Friedrich, 2014) as a basis for their evaluation. However, considering the diversity of news outlets in the current media system and an increased selective exposure to political information and media coverage, subjective evaluation criteria have gained greater importance in research (Hasebrink, 2021). Wolling's (2009) model of subjective quality assessment suggests personal characteristics, motivations, and attitudes to play a decisive role in shaping news evaluations. Yet, it is still unclear which subjective factors specifically shape the evaluation and perception of media reporting (Steppat et al., 2020).

Naturally, evaluations of media reporting differ according to the outlets that people typically use for obtaining news (e.g., Steppat et al., 2020). Since societal decision-makers select the media outlets they use on different grounds – sometimes, that would employ specific personnel to support them with the selection (Walgrave & Dejaeghere, 2017), it

seems plausible to assume that their use of information sources differs from the average population due to their resources and positions (cf., Fawzi, 2014). In this respect, we can hardly imagine how their information sources relate to their evaluation of media coverage. Therefore, we ask first:

RQ 1: To what extent do different sources of information affect the evaluation of media coverage by decision-makers?

Regardless of the information sources used, perceiving media coverage comprises of many facets, which might also very well differ from what ordinary audiences perceive: First, since decision-makers are themselves subject of media coverage, the amount of media attention they perceive about themselves might well coin their evaluation of quality (Kepplinger 2007). Yet, some decision-makers shun the public attention and are thus happy about the absence of media attention while others perceive media attention as necessary or at least beneficial for their aims (Spörer-Wagner & Marcinkowski, 2010).

RQ 2: How does the perceived amount of media attention about their decision-making relate to decision-makers' evaluation of the media coverage?

Second, research on the Hostile Media Effect additionally shows that recipients often tend to perceive news coverage as negative and hostile (Perloff, 2015). This impression is even reinforced when they assume that media coverage has an impact on others (e.g., Hansen & Kim, 2011). Such third person effects are often intertwined with hostile media perceptions (Tsfati & Cohen, 2013), but seldom examined regarding decision-makers media evaluations. Since they are often dependent on the support of others due to their position (e.g., being

elected), they are probably more susceptible to potential effects they assume the media to have on others (Kepplinger, 2007; Viehmann, 2020). Hence, we assume:

H 1: The more media influence decision-makers presume, the more critical they are of media coverage.

But not only specific patterns in using news or a greater susceptibility to hostile media perceptions and effects make decision-makers particularly distinct from ordinary recipients. Their news use is guided by professional needs and considerations (Sevenans et al., 2016). As such elites usually engage in public communication and interact with journalists (e.g., Blumler & Esser, 2019; Fawzi, 2014), their media activities might also be reflected in their evaluation of news coverage. Studies have shown that politicians who assume the media to be particularly influential in shaping public opinion, increased their communication activities (Cohen et al., 2008). Thus, one can assume that decision-makers try to attract journalist's attention for their goals and positions because they expect them to have an impact on the public. In doing so, several scenarios regarding the evaluation of news coverage are conceivable: If they perceive their own media activities to be successful, this might also reinforce a positive evaluation of news coverage. Conversely, the evaluation can also be affected by frustration because one's own PR was not received as expected. Beyond that it remains unclear, how dissatisfaction with one's own communication activities might affect their evaluation of media coverage. In view of these different scenarios, we thirdly ask:

RQ 3: To what extent does the evaluation of one's own media activities/public relations contribute to the evaluation of media coverage?

All in all, we assume that the factors outlined above play a specific role for explaining societal decision-makers impression of the media coverage about their decision-making process.

Media Influences on Political Elite Decision Making

The way political elites evaluate the media coverage might also be linked to their actual political decision making. To conceptualize such links, the mediatization paradigm provides a fruitful basis. It claims that the media has become an omnipresent and pervasive environment for actors from other societal systems, who increasingly incorporate media-related calculi into their operations and activities (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014; Marcinkowski, 2014). The impression, which decision-makers obtain of the media coverage could inform these media-related calculi.

The reason for this adaption of media-related principles and rules into one's considerations is explained by the fact that these actors depend on public attention and support – e.g. in order to be (re-)elected or to achieve their goals (Marcinkowski, 2014). Accordingly, there is an ever-increasing body of research evidencing such mediatization effects (e.g., Blumler & Esser, 2019; Haßler et al., 2014, Philipps, 2022). However, this empirical evidence mostly refers to the public communication activities and media strategies of such actors (e.g. CEOs, politicians) (Viehmann 2020). Yet, the core operations of societal elites – that is decision-making in terms of finding solutions for problems of broad societal relevance – are seldom covered by research (Fawzi, 2018; Reunanen et al. 2010). This is particularly puzzling, since such adaption processes to journalistic principles would constitute effects that are relevant for the everyday lives of large parts of the society (e.g. if a specific policy decision looks different due to mediatization effects) (Marcinkowski, 2014).

We suggest to consider negotiations as a framework to conceptualize societal elites' decision-making. A negotiation in terms of “bargaining entails two or more interdependent parties who perceive incompatible goals and engage in social interaction to reach a mutually satisfactory outcome” (Putnam & Roloff, 1992, p.3). As such, negotiations are particularly suitable to solve social and political conflicts which involve a broad variety of intertwined interests (Meade & Stasavage, 2006). Accordingly, they increasingly gain importance as a governance mechanism (e.g., when deciding upon policy issues, international treaties, M&A's, wage disputes), while other decision mechanisms (e.g., hierarchy) lose in relevance (Marcinkowski, 2014).

The role of media in negotiations would be profound, if it affected either the outcome or the way how the outcome is achieved, that is the choice of a bargaining strategy. Since an effect on the outcome necessarily incorporates also the negotiation process, we focus here on the choice of the bargaining strategy and how this is linked to media-related perceptions and evaluations.

Explaining the Choice of Bargaining Strategy

The bargaining process is mainly coined by the decision-makers' choice of strategy in terms of a “plan of action, specifying broad objectives and the general approach that should be taken to achieve them“ (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993, p. 3). In negotiation research, two overarching strategies are discerned – integrative and distributive bargaining (Walton & McKersie, 1965). While integrative bargaining is compromise-oriented in terms of achieving the best solution for all parties, distributive bargaining aims at egoistically maximizing one's own gains and is, hence, more confrontational in nature (e.g., negotiators rely on threats and bluffs) (see for an overview of different tactics: Brett & Thompson, 2016). Yet, these two bargaining styles are not mutually exclusive. In practice, negotiators combine tactics from both strategies to some

degree. The specific composition can also change during the negotiation process (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993).

One of the major factors affecting the negotiation process is the *atmosphere at the bargaining table* (Druckman & Olekalns, 2013). The general impression, whether the negotiating partners act cooperatively to solve the issue or whether the situation is more coined by suspicion and hardened fronts, has been shown to direct the choice of the bargaining strategy. The atmosphere at the bargaining table is closely related to the actual developments, especially if the *conflict between the negotiators escalated*, for example in terms of an interim termination or protests, then a distributive strategy becomes more likely (Curhan et al., 2010).

However, not only at the bargaining table itself, but also more generally, the *relationship to the conflicting partner* is of relevance for the choice of the bargaining strategy (Druckman & Olekalns, 2013): It has been shown that a relationship which is perceived on an eyelevel is more likely accompanied by a strategy that focusses the compromise (i.e. an integrative strategy) (Brett & Thompson, 2016). This perspective on the relationship between the conflicting partners closely corresponds to a negotiator's mindset. If they have what Gutmann and Thompson (2010) called a *mindset of compromise*, they will be more likely to consider the needs and necessities of the opponent and choose tactics related to an integrative bargaining strategy (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993).

Ultimately, although decision-makers negotiate as individual actors at the bargaining table, they are embedded in organizational and institutional structures (van Kleef et al., 2007). Therefore, also the characteristics of the organization or institution, whom the actor is representing at the bargaining table, are of relevance. Besides the specific *type of organization* in terms of size and focus, especially the *negotiator's standing* is relevant. Research from the field of negotiation research impressively showed that negotiators who did not experience as much support in their own organization chose a more confrontational strategy in order to

showcasing the own organization that she or he takes the representation job very serious (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993, van Kleef et al., 2007).

Media-related factors

While plenty of research from negotiation research provided evidence for factors that are related to the relationship between the conflicting partners or to a negotiator's own organization, media-related factors have only rarely been considered (Schrott & Spanger, 2007). The reason has long been the rationale, that most negotiations take place behind closed doors excluding journalists and the public from the decision-making process (e.g., Strömbäck & Esser, 2014). Therefore, the influence of the media and the public was supposed to be marginal. However, this conclusion does not seem plausible considering that these negotiations are concerned with issues of broad societal relevance attracting large public interest (Marcinkowski, 2014). Thus, negotiating actors have to consider the media and the public reactions while engaging in decision-making behind closed doors.

The main research interest is, whether and how *negotiator's evaluation of media coverage* regarding their conflict affects their choice of a bargaining strategy. Existing research suggests that especially a negative evaluation lends media coverage relevance among decision-makers' strategic considerations (Fawzi 2014, Kepplinger & Zerback, 2012). Media coverage that is perceived as negative poses a threat to a trustful interaction among negotiators at the bargaining table. The reason is that it potentially poses a threat to a negotiator's image – especially among her or his relevant target groups. Therefore, negotiators perceiving a negative public tone, become very vigilant to every kinds of overtones. They also become suspicious of the opponent whom they accuse to nourishing public discontent by actions such as leaking (Spörer-Wagner & Marcinkowski, 2010, Phillips, 2022). As a result, a confrontational strategy in terms of distributive bargaining becomes more likely:

H 2: The more negative the evaluation of the media coverage about one's decision-making process, the more likely negotiators choose a distributive and the less likely an integrative bargaining strategy.

However, evaluation of the media coverage is supposedly only one dimension of negotiators' overall impression how media and public reactions to their conflict look like (cf., Viehmann, 2020). We aim for drawing a full picture of this mediated public reaction by considering several adjunct characteristics: The mere amount of attention and presumed influences have been shown to be relevant for the decision-making activities (e.g., Cohen et al., 2008, Schrott & Spanger, 2007).

Finally, decision makers general assessment of the mediated public, that is whether they generally believe this to be a risky undertaking or more a chance for potentially beneficial support, will generally coin their impression of the public reaction (Reunanen et al., 2010). As assumed above, all the factors that heighten their vigilance towards the public discourse and as such aggravate a trustful and easy-going interaction among negotiators at the bargaining table, will most likely push a confrontational strategy:

H 3 - 5: The more attention, the more potential influences and the less they regard the mediated public as risky, the more likely negotiators will choose a distributive and less likely an integrative bargaining strategy.

Method: Surveying political elites

To investigate our assumptions on the role of media in societal decision-making, we chose industrial relations as a field of application. Every year, thousands of wage contracts are negotiated among employers and unions setting the working terms and conditions for millions

of workers. We conducted an online survey among high-level negotiators ($N = 326$) who had participated in collective bargaining since 2016. Our sample covers negotiators from all organizations involved in collective bargaining, that are unions ($n = 171$), employers' organizations ($n = 122$) and companies ($n = 33$). As with most elite surveys, we addressed a very challenging target group in terms of availability and responsiveness (Hofmann-Lange, 2007). Therefore, we decided to apply a multi-stage recruitment process that was run on a carefully crafted sample definition. While previous surveys of political elites administered a paper-and-pencil or face-to-face survey (Fawzi, 2014; Amsalem et al., 2017), our multi-stage recruitment and the fact that we fielded our survey during the COVID19 pandemic in Germany, made an online survey the only feasible way.

Sampling & Recruiting

We aimed at drawing our sample on all persons who have been actively involved in collective bargaining processes for trade unions and the employers' side in recent years. Since there is no list of all persons, let alone of all negotiations, it was first necessary to map these groups as systematically as possible. Starting from a list of all trade unions in Germany, we built up a database, in which we first included all unions from the German Trade Union Confederation, the largest umbrella organization of German unions representing almost six million employees (DGB, 2022). While these unions clearly represent the bulk of all union members in Germany, we still aimed in a second step to complement this sample for obtaining a full picture of the industrial relations in Germany. To do so, we added a random selection of all remaining unions outside the German Trade Union Confederation. The random sample here was stratified by the amount of media attention they had received in the past years to ensure that negotiations with differing amounts of public attention were included. For all these unions, we reconstructed their collective bargaining activities since 2016 and identified their

respective negotiation partners on the employers' side. For both, the unions and the employers' side (organizations and single companies), we identified those persons who were responsible for the collective bargaining activities. In total, we identified approximately 1,600 negotiations, which resulted in 572 contact persons. We contacted those persons between October 2021 and January 2022 by mail and e-mail. To ensure an adequate response rate we additionally arranged a telephone follow-up. Compared to other elite surveys (e.g., Dohle & Bernhard, 2014; Fawzi, 2018), the response rate of 56 % was remarkably good.

The final sample comprised of 326 negotiators. 21 % were female, respondents were on average 52 years old ($SD = 9.93$). On average, the negotiators had already been negotiating such wage agreements for 12 years ($SD = 10.33$). More than half of the sample comprised of full-time negotiators (54 %), while 46 % participated as voluntary representatives.

Questionnaire

Media-related factors

Information use. We relied on negotiator's self-reported frequency of using different news sources during the last collective bargaining. They were asked "*How often did you pay attention during the last round of collective bargaining to what was said or written in the following information sources?*" (see Appendix 1). They indicated, whether they used *local print media, public broadcasting television, private television, nationally distributed newspapers, news on social media* such as Facebook, *economic newspapers, tabloids, own press releases, press releases of the opponent, members' magazines and newsletters* and *other internal channels* (e.g., face-to-face conversations, posts on the intranet) "never" (= 0) to "very often" (= 5). An exploratory factor analysis (principal component analysis with oblimin rotation; cumulated total variance 58.4%; $KMO = .785$, $p < .001$; eigenvalue: factor 1 = 3.81; factor 2 = 1.54; factor 3 = 1.08) revealed three consistent factors representing broader usage practices: using public services & (economic) newspapers ($\alpha = .778$, $M = 2.96$; $SD = 1.12$),

using tabloids & private television ($\alpha = .614, M = 1.67; SD = .85$)¹ and using internal sources ($\alpha = .722, M = 3.92; SD = 1.04$) (see also Appendix 1).

Perceived public attention. Following existing surveys of politicians (e.g., Fawzi, 2018) we asked the negotiators how much attention about the collective bargaining process they perceived in different media (e.g., regional/local media outlets, specialized industry media) as well as among different groups (e.g., the general population). They could assess from 1 = “not at all” to 5 “very much”. All items build up the perceived public attention scale ($\alpha = .833, M = 2.52; SD = 0.87$).

Risk estimation of mediated public. To establish how negotiators evaluate the mediated public more generally, we asked for a risk assessment. The items were adapted from Kepplinger and Weichselbaum (2014) in light of the evidence provided by Reunanen and colleagues (2010). To account for the fact that some negotiations receive a lot of attention, while others run below the public attention line, we employed a filter mechanism. Negotiators who said that their wage disputes received a lot of media attention, were asked in three semantic differentials whether such a great attention can generally be regarded as “a chance/risk to one’s own goals”, “beneficial/detrimental for their endeavor” and whether the coverage posed “head- vs. tailwind for their negotiation goals”. Those who reported of having received little attention were asked the same questions except of the latter, but with a different introduction: “I have the impression, that such little attention has...”. Cronbach’s Alpha was good in both filter conditions ($\alpha_{\text{much attention}} = .896, \alpha_{\text{little attention}} = .818$, overall descriptives: $M = 2.94, SD = 0.99$).

¹ Cronbach’s alpha for the resulting scale was $\alpha = .614$, which was below the commonly accepted threshold of .70. However, as Cronbach’s alpha is sensitive to the number of items (Cronbach 1951), an alpha value of at least .60 is frequently regarded as acceptable for less than four statements (for an example from communication research: Matthes 2006).

Evaluation of media coverage: Negotiators were asked to evaluate how the last round of collective bargaining, in which they had participated was reported in the media coverage. In reference to similar elite surveys (e.g., Fawzi, 2018) they were asked to evaluate the coverage along ten items on a scale from 1 “not apply at all” to 5 “fully applies”. Those items map two theoretical dimensions: *adequacy* (e.g., “Debates in the negotiations were often portrayed as disputes.”) and *fairness* (e.g., “The media reported fairly.”). All items were summarized in a mean index ($\alpha = .885$, $M = 3.31$; $SD = .81$). Departing from these overarching theoretical dimensions and considering the findings of our previous qualitative interview study with 33 high-rank negotiators (cf. Authors 2021) we decided to build up two more narrowly defined subdimensions: *lack of accuracy* (e.g., “The main facts have been correctly reported. (rev.)”; $\alpha = .713$; $M = 2.84$; $SD = .095$) and *bias* (e.g., “One side received more sympathy than the other (rev.)”; $\alpha = .824$; $M = 2.86$; $SD = 1.09$).

Presumed media influence. Based on research on presumed media influences in elite surveys (e.g., Cohen et al., 2008, Fawzi, 2014, Kepplinger & Zerback, 2012) we asked the negotiators whether and to what extent they think that the discussion in the news coverage and in the public had an impact on twelve different negotiation-related aspects (e.g., working atmosphere, outcome) recorded on a scale from 1 “no impact” to 5 “strong impact”. All items were summarized in a mean index ($\alpha = .926$, $M = 2.59$; $SD = 0.89$)

Factors related to the decision arena

Bargaining strategy. Building on the ideas of Spörer-Wagner & Marcinkowski (2011) and Weingart et al (1990) we differentiated between a distributive (= competitive) and an integrative (= compromise) bargaining strategy. They were asked to indicate on 5-point scale from 1 “never” to 5 “very often” how often different tactics played a role in the negotiation process. A distributive strategy was measured by items like “We presented certain aspects as having no alternative.” or “We created emotional pressure.”. The tactics representing the integrative strategy were, in contrast, more inclined to reach a compromise (e.g., “We made

concessions to the other side.”; “We dropped points that were not as important to us to come one step closer to an agreement.”). Cronbach’s Alpha for these two scales was on an acceptable level ($\alpha_{\text{integrative}} = .70$; $M = 3.71$; $SD = 0.53$; $\alpha_{\text{distributive}} = .84$; $M = 3.09$; $SD = 0.68$).

Atmosphere at the negotiation table. To capture the atmosphere during the negotiations, participants rated eleven items referring to different sentiments at the bargaining table (e.g., hectic, rough, trustful, suspicious etc.) on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 “not apply at all” to 5 “fully applies”. All items were summarized in a mean index ($\alpha = .891$, $M = 3.07$; $SD = 0.77$).

Perceived power relationship among the negotiators. To further capture the relationship among the negotiators, we asked whether the negotiators perceive the relationship to the opponent at an eye level (adapted from van Kleef et al., 2006). To do so, participants rated with a continuous slider who had the “greater influence on the course of the negotiation”, “the better bargaining position”, and “the greater control over the situation”. These three items were merged into an index with a satisfactory Cronbach’s Alpha of ($\alpha = .75$, $Min = 2$, $Max = 99.33$, $M = 47.64$; $SD = 18.76$).

Mindset of compromise. Different measurements have been developed to capture a negotiator’s general mindset (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). However, some are hardly discernable from the bargaining strategies. We followed the main conclusion from research on bargaining strategies that a compromise-oriented approach greatly centers on the idea to listen and pay attention to the other side. Such a behavior is associated with a pronounced mindset of compromise (Gutmann & Thompson, 2010). For this reason, we measured a negotiator’s general mindset of compromise by asking to what extent she or he would incorporate the needs of the opponent in general and of the opponent’s members in particular. Both items show sufficient internal consistency ($\alpha = .788$) to be merged into a composite index ($M = 3.08$; $SD = 1.16$).

Standing in one’s own organization. To assess, whether the negotiator felt support among her or his organization (adapted from Mael & Ashforth, 1992 “perceived organizational

prestige”), we asked whether “they felt to be trusted by the organization” in general and “the members” in particular, whether perceive to “have a restricted mandate” and whether they “are held in high esteem by the organization”. All items were assessed on five-point Likert scales ranging from 1 “I don’t agree” to 5 ‘I fully agree’. All four items were collapsed into one composite index with sufficient reliability ($\alpha = .77$, $M = 4.13$; $SD = 0.65$).

Factors related to public relations

Role in public relations. As spokesmen nowadays also take part in such trade negotiations, we differentiated if participants had a role in public relations asking if they were officially in charge of media and public relations tasks for their organization (1 = no, 2 = yes).

Evaluation of own public relations. Based on a previous interview study with selected negotiators and PR experts in unions and employer organizations (cf., Authors 2021), we identified key demands they usually make regarding their public relations. Building on these demands (e.g., correctness, complexity, fairness, timing) and inspired by Spörer-Wagner & Marcinkowski (2010) participants were asked to rate their media activities during the last negotiation on 18 items (e.g., "Overall, we were quite fair in our communication."; “In our own communications, we have been quick to respond to public discussions.”) on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 “does not apply at all” to 5 “fully applies”. All items were summarized in a mean index ($\alpha = .741$, $M = 3.77$; $SD = 0.46$).

Control variables

Escalation of conflict. As a measurement of the conflictual nature, we took typical forms of escalation in such wage disputes into account (Lesch, 2013). Negotiators were asked to indicate all situations (e.g., cancellation of wage agreement, strike, agreement, etc.) happened during the last negotiation. We summarized if there was at least one escalation (e.g., threat of strike, breakdown of negotiations, warning of a strike) and built up a dichotomous variable (0 = “no escalation”, 1 = “escalation of conflict”).

Degree of Organization. To measure the importance of their organizations in the branch, where they are active, we asked negotiators how well their organization represents employees/companies in their industry on a scale from 1 “poor” to 5 “well” ($M = 1.70$; $SD = 4.32$).

Conflict party. Negotiators were asked for whom they had participated in the last collective bargaining (0 = “union”, 1 = “employers' organization/company”).

Analysis

To provide evidence with regards to our research questions and assumptions, multivariate regression analyses were estimated. First, the evaluation of media coverage served as the dependent variable and information use, media-related perceptions, factors related to public relations, and variables to control for the negotiation context entered as independent variables. In a second step, the evaluation of media coverage became a central independent variable in regression models predicting the choice of a bargaining strategy. Beyond the evaluation of media coverage, other media-related perceptions as well as factors describing the situation at the bargaining table and the interaction with the opponent entered these models as predictors. Since we were interested in very specific facets of negotiators' media perceptions and evaluation, we introduced a general impression of the media coverage as a control into our models. This *overall satisfaction with news coverage* asked for a global, more subjective assessment how satisfied negotiators were overall with the news coverage of the last wage dispute on a scale from 1 “very dissatisfied” to 5 “very satisfied” ($M = 3.02$; $SD = .83$). Missing values in on or more of the model variables led to listwise deletion. Therefore, the sample size of the regression models comprised of between $n = 218$ - 226 .

Results

Controlling for decision-makers' overall satisfaction with media reporting, findings of a regression analysis revealed numerous factors that shaped their evaluation (see *Table 1*).

[Table 1 about here]

Contrary to our assumption none of the information sources the decision-makers used (*RQ 1*) significantly predicted their evaluation in our model. Roughly, only internal sources paid to a positive assessment ($\beta = .112, p = .068$). Regarding the amount of public attention as a kind of precondition for the evaluation of media coverage (*RQ 2*), results showed that perceived public attention emerged as the strongest negative predictor ($\beta = -.248, p < .001$). Negotiators are more positive in their evaluation if they perceive less public attention to their negotiation. In view of media influences decision-makers had presumed (*H 1*), findings revealed: the greater the influence they assumed the media coverage to have, the more negative their rating ($\beta = -.138, p < .05$) supporting *H 1*. Yet, there were no differences between negotiators and PR experts involved in the bargaining process ($\beta = -.026, p = n. s.$). However, the evaluation of the news coverage was fed by the evaluation of their own communication performance (*RQ 3*): Decision-makers were more positive in their assessment if they were also satisfied with their own PR ($\beta = .191, p < .001$).

Comparing the predictors for the overall evaluation of media coverage and the specific subdimensions perceived bias and lack of accuracy, hardly any differences occurred in view of the factors that shape the evaluation (also see *Table 1*). However, it became clear that perceived public attention ($\beta_{bias} = .204, p < .010$; $\beta_{accuracy} = .099, p = n.s.$) and presumed media influence ($\beta_{bias} = .125, p < .05$; $\beta_{accuracy} = .083, p = n.s.$) contributed primarily to perceived bias of media coverage and were not associated with a perceived lack of accuracy. Conversely, the evaluation of one's own public relations was an even stronger predictor for a

perceived lack of accuracy ($\beta = -.201, p < .001$) than for perceived bias ($\beta = -.176, p < .010$) of media coverage.

In a second step, we investigated the role of media-related perceptions – and above all the evaluation of the media coverage about one's own negotiation – for explaining the choice of a bargaining strategy. In these models, we controlled for factors capturing the specific negotiation context as well as a negotiator's embeddedness in a larger organization. We estimated two separate models for each bargaining strategy, since they are not mutually exclusive. In sum, while the distributive, i.e., conflict-oriented strategy corresponded in many cases with various media-related perceptions, the integrative strategy was characterized above all by a pronounced orientation toward the other side. The more media and public attention the decision-makers perceived for their negotiation ($b = 0.132, p = .013$), the more satisfied they were overall with the coverage ($b = 0.138, p = .007$), and the less risky they evaluated attention from the mediated public ($b = -0.087, p = .029$), the more likely they were to use competitive tactics. In contrast, these characteristics had no effect on the choice of an integrative strategy. Thus, H3 & H5 were partly supported with regards to a distributive bargaining strategy, while H4 regarding presumed media influences was rejected in light of non-significant predictors for both bargaining strategies. The compromise-oriented strategy was rather favored by a good atmosphere at the negotiation table ($b = 0.130, p = .013$), while a negative atmosphere significantly pushed the choice of tactics known from a distributive strategy ($b = -0.305, p < .001$). The standing in one's own organization significantly predicted the choice of both strategies ($b_{dis} = 0.191, p = .001$; $b_{int} = 0.233, p < .001$). Yet, this factor, which essentially captures the organizational context, was a stronger predictor of an integrative rather than a distributive strategy. The same pattern was observable for the mindset of compromise in terms of paying attention to the needs and boundaries of the opponent, which was only significant for choosing an integrative strategy ($b = 0.127, p < .001$).

Looking at our central construct of interest, the quality evaluation of the media coverage about one's conflict, the results seemed ambiguous: Despite the seemingly distinct nature of the two negotiation strategies, the evaluation of the coverage about their negotiations had a negative effect in both cases ($b_{\text{dis}} = -0.161, p = .004$; $b_{\text{int}} = -0.100, p = .069$) partly supporting H2 (confirmed for distributive bargaining, rejected for integrative bargaining). However, the effect was stronger for choosing a distributive strategy. To explore this effect in greater detail, additional models were estimated in which the subdimensions bias and lack of accuracy entered the model as predictors: They showed that the distributive strategy corresponded with the impression of imbalance in reporting ($b = 0.153, p = .001$), while the integrative strategy was favored when the negotiators had the impression that facts were misrepresented or abbreviated ($b = 0.169, p = .001$).

[Figure 1 & 2 about here]

Discussion

All in all, the findings shed first light on the subjective manner in which decision-makers evaluate media coverage: Although there were no significant differences in the evaluation between the individual information sources used, it became apparent that elites' rating of news coverage was related to the amount of public attention they perceived, the extent to which they presume media influences and how they evaluate their own public relations.

Our results thus firstly contrast with those obtained by Steppat et al. (2020) for ordinary audiences: Decision-makers did not differ in their evaluation of media coverage according to the information sources they used. Considering the fact that decision-makers use media coverage as part of their professional obligations might result in the fact that they tend to get a broader picture of public communication anyway, especially since they are provided

with current news overviews by their personnel to help them keep up to date (Walgrave & Dejaeghere, 2017). Elites rated reporting more critically if they perceived a lot of public attention during their decision-making supporting research on reciprocal effects (Kepplinger, 2007) and connecting to the findings by Spörer-Wagner & Marcinkowski (2010) in the sense that negotiators in general seem to be less pleased with media attention. Since third person effects and hostile media perceptions are commonly not examined regarding elites, it has been vague how much presumed media influence affects a (critical) evaluation of reporting. Our findings confirm such processes regarding societal decision-makers as they downgraded the quality of news coverage if they had perceived great impact of media on their negotiations. Furthermore, our results revealed that a negative evaluation of media coverage goes along with a critical assessment of one's own media activities. A closer look revealed that a poor rating of own media activities contributes in particular to a perceived lack of accuracy in reporting, which suggests that decision-makers feel particularly responsible here and are accordingly dissatisfied if they cannot remedy these inaccuracies in media coverage through their public relations. However, it remains unclear, and is thus open to further research, to what extent both evaluations are mutually influencing each other over time.

The second part of our analysis revealed that decision-makers evaluation of the media coverage about their negotiation cases was linked to their strategic choices in the decision-making process. More precisely, we investigated how different facets of decision-makers media-related perceptions and evaluations related to their choice of a distributive and an integrative bargaining strategy – both of which are not mutually exclusive, but differ in their style with the first being more confrontational and the latter being more compromise-focused (Walton & McKersie, 1965).

All in all, the distributive bargaining strategy seemed to embody the mediatised bargaining strategy par excellence being manifold linked to media-related perceptions and being accompanied by a great deal of tensions and conflict in the negotiation. On the other

side, the integrative strategy seemed more aligned to the ideal type of compromise building in negotiations. Here, media is only expected to fulfill its basic functions of presenting reality as accurate as possible. Other media-related factors did not count in. This clear cut difference is also mirrored by the explained variance of both models: While the predictors explained the choice of a distributive strategy quite well ($R^2 = .42$), the integrative strategy was considerably less well explained by the set of independent factors used ($R^2 = .18$).

While our results provide evidence for a link between media-related perceptions and evaluations, they are limited to the cross-sectional design of the survey as we cannot claim for causality or proof the direction of the correlations found in our analysis. Although we achieved a more than acceptable response rate, the multi-stage character of our recruitment strategy made us reliant on the support of the gatekeepers at the unions and employer's organizations to forward our invitation. Therefore, our sample is most likely akin to self-selection among the decision-makers.

Nevertheless, this study allows meaningful insight into this seldom surveyed population of societal decision-makers by looking simultaneously at their strategic considerations and actions as well as their media-related thoughts. Thus, we gained unique inside into their assessment of journalism which is crucial as their perceptions in their role as societal opinion leaders and multiplier might also have an impact on the general population. Therefore, the fact that the majority of our participants neither compliments nor runs down journalists' work seems to appease debates on how elites promote polarization in public (Heiberger et al., 2022). Furthermore, we decisively extended research on the mediatization of the core activities of societal decision-making (i.e., choosing a specific bargaining strategy), which appears as chance but also challenge in negotiation. Transparency of political decision-making is a high value in democratic theory, yet the public observation was often accused of inhibiting reasonable results. Our results indicate a pathway how both a transparent decision-

making process can be established while keeping the incentives for a confrontational strategy as low as possible.

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Table 1. Regression analysis for predicting the evaluation of media coverage

	overall evaluation of media coverage		perceived bias of media coverage		perceived lack of accuracy in media coverage	
	β	p	β	p	β	p
<i>Information use</i>						
public services & (economic) newspapers	-.025	.690	.011	.879	.111	.101
tabloids & private TV	-.090	.109	.103	.106	.021	.735
internal sources	.112	.068	-.059	.390	-.134*	.046
<i>(other) media-related factors</i>						
Overall satisfaction with media coverage	.475***	< .001	-.317***	< .001	-.378***	< .001
Perceived public attention	-.230***	< .001	.204**	.005	.099	.154
Presumed media influence	-.138*	.013	.125*	.049	.083	.177
<i>Factors related to public relations</i>						
Role in public relations (1 = no, 2 = yes)	-.026	.620	.021	.716	.001	.985
Evaluation of own public relations	.191***	< .001	-.176*	.007	-.201***	< .001
<i>Control variables</i>						
Conflict party (0 = union, 1 = employer organization/company)	-.155**	.006	.225***	< .001	.040	.511
Degree of organization	-.008	.880	.007	.907	-.033	.560
Escalation of conflict (0 = no escalation, 1 = at least one escalation)	-.119*	.025	.063	.293	.191*	.001
R ² -Wert	.417		.251		.297	
F-Wert	F(11/219) = 15.940, p < .001		F(11/219) = 8.007, p < .001		F(11/219) = 9.829, p < .001	

Note. n = 218; * p < .05; ** p < .010; *** p < .001




Figure 1. Predicting negotiator's choice of bargaining strategy

Note. Unstandardized coefficients, bars indicate 95% CI, $N = 226-227$, $R^2_{\text{integrative}} = .18$, $F_{\text{integrative}}(12/214) = 5.229$, $p < .001$; $R^2_{\text{distributive}} = .42$, $F_{\text{distributive}}(12/213) = 14.64$, $p < .001$.




Figure 2. Predicting negotiator's choice of bargaining strategy with detailed estimators for evaluation of media coverage

Note. Unstandardized coefficients, bars indicate 95% CI, $N = 226-227$, $R^2_{\text{integrative}} = .22$, $F_{\text{integrative}}(13/213) = 5.808$, $p < .001$; $R^2_{\text{distributive}} = .44$, $F_{\text{distributive}}(13/212) = 14.74$, $p < .001$.

Appendix 1. Overview of the measures

Measures	Items	scale
Media-related factors		
<i>Information use</i>	How often did you pay attention during the last round of collective bargaining to what was said or written in the following information sources?	1 = “never” 5 = “very often”
	<p><i>public services & (economic) newspapers</i> ($\alpha = .778, M = 2.96; SD = 1.12$)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ local print media ▪ public broadcasting television ▪ nationally distributed newspapers ▪ economic newspapers <p><i>tabloids & private television</i> ($\alpha = .614, M = 1.67; SD = 0.85$)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ private television ▪ tabloids <p><i>internal sources</i> ($\alpha = .722, M = 3.92; SD = 1.04$)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ own press releases ▪ members’ magazines and newsletters ▪ other internal channels (e.g., face-to-face conversations, posts on the intranet) 	
<i>Perceived public attention</i>	And how much would you say was said about the collective bargaining process in the following types of media and among the following groups of people?	1 = “not at all” 5 = “very much”
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ... in the general population ▪ ... in regional/local media outlets (e.g., regional newspaper and local radio and television stations) ▪ ... on social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter or Xing/LinkedIn) ▪ ... in national mass media (e.g., in Germany-wide daily newspapers or on television) ▪ ... in specialized industry media <p>$\alpha = .833, M = 2.52; SD = 0.87$</p>	
<i>Risk estimation of mediated public</i>	<p><i>For negotiators who said that their wage disputes received much media attention:</i></p> <p>I had the overall impression that the way in which the public and media perceived our negotiation ...</p>	

-
- 1 = “posed a risk to our goals” to 5 = “offered opportunities to achieve our goals”
 - 1 = “was disadvantageous for us” to 5 = “was advantageous for us”
 - 1 = “represented headwind for our issue” to 5 = “represented tailwind for our issue”

($\alpha = .896$)

who said that their wage disputes received little media attention:

I have the impression, that such little attention ...

- 1 = “posed a risk to our goals” to 5 = “offered opportunities to achieve our goals”
- 1 = “was disadvantageous for us” to 5 = “was advantageous for us”

($\alpha = .818$)

(overall: $M = 2.94$, $SD = 0.99$)

<i>Evaluation of media coverage</i>	From your point of view, how was the last round of collective bargaining reported in the media overall?	1 = “not apply at all” 5 = “fully applies”
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Adequacy/fairness

- The main facts have been reported correctly.
 - Errors or misunderstandings have been overemphasized (rev.).
 - The media exaggerated the situation (rev.).
 - Key facts surrounding the collective bargaining were missing (rev.).
 - Debates in the negotiations were often portrayed as fierce disputes (rev.).
 - The public discussion looked at things very differently than I saw them (rev.).
 - My organization's position was not accurately portrayed in the reporting.
 - The media reported fairly.
 - One side received more sympathy than the other (rev.)
 - The positions of one side were discussed in more detail than those of the other (rev.).
-

<i>Perceived lack of accuracy in media coverage</i>	<p>From your point of view, how was the last round of collective bargaining reported in the media overall?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The public discussion looked at things very differently than I saw them. ▪ Key facts surrounding the collective bargaining were missing. ▪ My organization's points were not accurately portrayed in the reporting. 	<p>1 = “not apply at all” 5 = “fully applies”</p>
(M = 2.84; SD = 0.95; α = .71)		
<i>Perceived bias of media coverage</i>	<p>From your point of view, how was the last round of collective bargaining reported in the media overall?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ One side received more sympathy than the other. ▪ The positions of one side were discussed in more detail than those of the other. 	<p>1 = “not apply at all” 5 = “fully applies”</p>
(M = 2.86; SD = 1.09; α = .82)		
<i>Overall satisfaction with media coverage</i>	<p>How satisfied have you been overall with the news coverage of the last wage dispute?</p> <p>(M = 3.02; SD = 0.83)</p>	<p>1 = “very dissatisfied” 5 = “very satisfied”</p>
<i>Presumed media influence</i>	<p>If you now recall how your last collective bargaining was discussed all in all, in the news coverage and in public: Did you feel that had an impact on the following points?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Scope of actions for the opposite side ▪ The atmosphere among the ranks of the opponent’s side ▪ The public opinion ▪ Relationship between the bargaining parties ▪ Duration of decision-making processes ▪ Willingness of the other side to compromise ▪ Strategy of my organization in the negotiation ▪ Working atmosphere in the negotiations ▪ The outcome of the negotiation ▪ The climate among the members of my organization 	<p>1 = “no impact” 5 = “strong impact”</p>

-
- Willingness of my organization to compromise
 - Scope of actions for my organization

(M = 2.59; SD = .89; α = 0.93)

Factors related to the decision arena

Bargaining strategy Below you will find statements about how to proceed in negotiations to achieve your goals. Please tell us in each case how often this played a role in the process of your negotiation. 1 = “never”
5 = “very often”

integrative (M = 3.71; SD = .53; α = .70)

We have

- ... shown interest in the position of the other side.
- ... resolved differences regarding our standpoints together with the other party.
- ... communicated openly and honestly with the other party.
- ... made concessions to the other side.
- ... explained our position with additional background information.
- ... dropped points that were not as important to us in order to come one step closer to an agreement.
- ... asked the other side for further information and background on their position.
- ... searched for compromises together with the other side.

distributive (M = 3.09; SD = .68; α = .84)

We have ...

- ... used strike action to create public sentiment in our favor.
 - ... offensively attacked the position of the other side.
 - ... created emotional pressure.
 - ... showed ourselves to be persistent.
 - ... called for a strike or threatened to strike.
 - ... tried to leave the other side only limited opportunities for action.
 - ... presented certain aspects as having no alternative.
 - ... threatened to break off or fail the negotiations.
 - ... stuck to our position.
 - ... carried out smaller warning strikes.
 - ... pointed out red lines.
-

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ... at one point or another, we also relied on threats. 	
<i>Atmosphere at the negotiation table</i>	<p>How did you perceive the atmosphere at the bargaining table between yourself and the other party?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Stressed ▪ Fronts were hardened ▪ Suspicious ▪ Cumbersome ▪ Respectful ▪ Humorous ▪ Hectic ▪ It quickly became clear what an agreement could look like ▪ Factual ▪ Rough ▪ Trustful 	<p>1 = "not apply at all" 5 = "fully applies"</p>
	($\alpha = .89$; $M = 3.07$; $SD = 0.78$)	
<i>Perceived power relationship among negotiators</i>	<p>For which side in the collective bargaining process were the following points more applicable?</p> <p>Who had ...</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ the greater influence on the course of the negotiation? ▪ the better bargaining position? ▪ the greater control over the situation? 	<p>1 = "clearly we" 100 = "clearly the opponent side"</p>
	($\alpha = .75$, $M = 47.64$; $SD = 18.76$)	
<i>Standing in one's own organization</i>	<p>People like me who participate in collective bargaining for our organization ...</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ enjoy a high reputation within our organization. ▪ are given a wide scope of action to act on the part of our organization. ▪ feel trusted by the organization. ▪ feel trust among the members. 	<p>1 = "I don't agree" 5 = "I fully agree"</p>
	($\alpha = .77$, $M = 4.13$; $SD = 0.65$)	
<i>Mindset of compromise</i>	<p>How important were the following persons during the last negotiation (i.e. to what extent have you tried to consider their reactions or thoughts)?</p>	<p>1 = "not important" 5 = "very important"</p>

- the opponent
- the opponent's members

($\alpha = .788$; $M = 3.08$; $SD = 1.16$)

Factors related to public relations		
<i>Role in public relations</i>	Have you been officially in charge of media and public relations tasks for your organization during the last collective bargaining?	1 = "no" 2 = "yes"
<i>Evaluation of own public relations</i>	If you remember how your organization communicated information about the negotiations during the last round, what was it like? By that we mean all kinds of activities, e.g. press conferences, press releases, social media contributions, but also interviews with journalists.	1 = "not apply at all" 5 = "fully applies"

Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements.

- We communicated too little.
- Now and then we also emphasized emotions in the negotiation.
- We prepared and conveyed complex background information in an understandable way.
- We correctly presented the essential facts.
- Overall, we were very fair in our communication.
- We provided factual and unemotional information about the negotiations.
- We often communicated too slowly.
- Some points in our argumentation were misleading.
- We were often not able to explain complex backgrounds adequately.
- Sometimes we intentionally exaggerated the situation.
- We always had a good timing in our communication.
- We were caught off guard by developments in the public or media debate.
- We took care to treat information from the negotiations discreetly.

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- We succeeded in maintaining control on what was communicated from the negotiations to the outside.
 - We had to cut our losses in public.
 - We released confidential information that was detrimental to the other side.
 - In our own communications, we responded quickly to public discussions.
 - Overall, we were quite fair in our communication.

($\alpha = .741$, $M = 3.77$; $SD = 0.46$).

Control factors		
<i>Escalation of conflict</i>	<p>In collective bargaining, there are commonly different milestones. Not every collective bargaining process goes through all the milestones. How was the situation in the last collective bargaining in which you were involved?</p> <p>Please indicate all the milestones that took place in your collective bargaining. It is not important whether these milestones were triggered by you or the other side.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Preliminary discussions ▪ Cancellation of a wage agreement ▪ negotiation rounds, number: ____ ▪ Symbolic actions before a strike (e.g., "actions outside the gate") ▪ Threat of strike ▪ Threat of lockout ▪ (temporary) interruption of negotiations ▪ Warn strike or call for a warn strike ▪ Call for strike ▪ (temporary) breakdown of negotiations ▪ Conciliation ▪ Juridical proceedings parallel to collective bargaining dispute ▪ Ballot on strike ▪ Unlimited strike or industrial action ▪ Agreement ▪ Ballot to accept the result of negotiations 	<p>0 = no escalation of conflict</p> <p>1 = escalation of conflict (e.g., threat of strike/lockout, interruption/breakdown of negotiations, warning strike/strike, juridical proceedings, conciliation, agreement (rev.))</p>
<i>Degree of Organization</i>	<p>If you think specifically of the industry or occupational group for which you negotiated recently - what is the density of your union? //</p>	<p>1 = "low"</p> <p>5 = "high"</p>

How well does your employer organization
represent the companies in your industry?

(M = 1.70; SD = 4.32)

<i>Conflict Party</i>	At the last collective bargaining session, for whom did you participate?	0 = "union" 1 = "employer organi- zation/company"
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Appendix 2. Modell predictors for choosing a distributive/integrative bargaining strategy

	Distributive Strategy			Integrative Strategy			Distributive Strategy			Integrative Strategy		
	B	SE	p	B	SE	p	B	SE	p	B	SE	p
Intercept	3.432	0.446	0.000 ***	2.058	0.437	0.000 ***	2.531	0.437	0.000 ***	1.313	0.427	0.002 **
Degree of Organization	-0.012	0.017	0.464	0.004	0.016	0.804	-0.013	0.016	0.421	0.008	0.016	0.602
Conflict party	-0.350	0.078	0.000 ***	0.051	0.076	0.501	-0.385	0.078	0.000 ***	0.078	0.076	0.305
Escalation of conflict	0.301	0.093	0.001 **	-0.012	0.090	0.898	0.323	0.092	0.001 ***	-0.049	0.090	0.583
Perceived public attention	0.133	0.053	0.013 *	0.019	0.052	0.714	0.124	0.052	0.018 *	0.032	0.051	0.530
Risk estimation of mediated public	-0.087	0.039	0.029 *	0.006	0.038	0.879	-0.090	0.039	0.021 *	-0.002	0.038	0.963
Evaluation of media coverage	-0.161	0.056	0.004 **	-0.100	0.055	0.069 †						
<i>Evaluation of media coverage: Bias</i>							0.153	0.044	0.001 ***	-0.031	0.042	0.467
<i>Evaluation of media coverage: Lack of accuracy</i>							-0.001	0.051	0.986	0.169	0.050	0.001 ***
General satisfaction with news coverage	0.138	0.051	0.007 **	0.047	0.050	0.347	0.124	0.048	0.010 *	0.061	0.047	0.192
Presumed media influence	-0.019	0.043	0.653	0.045	0.042	0.292	-0.026	0.042	0.536	0.042	0.041	0.309
Mindset of compromise	0.056	0.034	0.101	0.127	0.033	0.000 ***	0.062	0.033	0.064 †	0.118	0.033	0.000 ***
Atmosphere in the negotiation	-0.305	0.053	0.000 ***	0.130	0.052	0.013 *	-0.299	0.052	0.000 ***	0.135	0.051	0.008 **
Power relationship among negotiators	-0.007	0.002	0.000 ***	-0.002	0.002	0.244	-0.007	0.002	0.000 ***	-0.002	0.002	0.214
Standing in one's own organization	0.191	0.059	0.001 **	0.233	0.057	0.000 ***	0.192	0.057	0.001 ***	0.232	0.056	0.000 ***
R ²	0.42			0.18			0.44			0.22		
F-Test	F(12/213) = 14.64, p < .000			F(12/214) = 5.229, p < .000			F(13/212) = 14.74, p < .000			F(13/213) = 5.808, p < .000		

Note. Unstandardized coefficients, † p<.10, * p<0.05 **p<0.01 *** p<0.001; N = 226-227, Models with global estimator for quality of media coverage: R²_{integrative} = .18, F_{integrative}(12/214) = 5.229, p < .001; R²_{distributive} = .42, F_{distributive}(12/213) = 14.64, p < .001; Models differentiating between subdimensions of quality of media coverage: R²_{integrative} = .22, F_{integrative}(13/213) = 5.808, p < .001; R²_{distributive} = .44, F_{distributive}(13/212) = 14.74, p < .001.