

Locke as Schopenhauer's (Kantian) Philosophical Ancestor

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Arthur Schopenhauer had a deep appreciation for the philosophies of the classical British Empiricists, John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume. As Julien Young has argued, Schopenhauer shared the empiricists' allegiance to a form of concept empiricism, the thesis that all meaningful discourse must be derived ultimately from experience.¹ Schopenhauer's allegiance to concept empiricism is not surprising, however, given his commitment to developing an immanent philosophy, in Kant's sense of that term, and his decidedly unKantian conception of metaphysics as "the correct explanation of experience as a whole" (WII 181/201).² Although Schopenhauer praised Berkeley by recognizing him as "the father of Idealism" (PI 77/82), lauded him for the insight that there is no object without a subject, he also claimed, however, that "the remainder of his doctrines cannot endure" (WI 3/4). While Schopenhauer held Hume in high regard, proposed translating his *Natural History of Religion* and *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* into German,³ and he also said that there was more to learn in a single page of Hume's writings than there was from "the collected

¹ Julian Young, *Willing and Unwilling: A Study in the Philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 22-25.

² I will cite Schopenhauer's books using the following acronyms, with the first set of Arabic numerals referring to the page number of the following English-language translations, and the second set to corresponding page numbers of Arthur Hübscher's historical-critical edition of *Sämtliche Werke* (Wiesbaden: F.A. Brockhaus, 1972), 7 volumes:

BM = *On the Basis of Morality*, trans. E.F.J. Payne (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995); *Sämtliche Werke*, Bd. 4.

FR = *On the Fourfold Root of the Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, trans. E.F.J. Payne (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1974); *Sämtliche Werke*, Bd. 1.

FW = *Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will*, trans. E.F.J. Payne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); *Sämtliche Werke*, Bd. 4.

WI or WII = *The World as Will and Representation*, trans. E.F.J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1969), 2 volumes; *Sämtliche Werke*, Bde. 2, 3.

WN = *On the Will in Nature*, trans. E.F.J. Payne (New York: Berg, 1992); *Sämtliche Werke*, Bd. 4.

PI or PII = *Parerga and Paralipomena*, trans. E.F.J. Payne (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 2 volumes; *Sämtliche Werke*, Bde. 5, 6. .

³ See Schopenhauer's letter "An Einen Verlags Buchhändler," November 25, 1824, where he proposed translating into German Hume's *Natural History of Religion* and *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, in Arthur Schopenhauer: *Gesammelte Briefe*, ed. Arthur Hübscher (Bonn: Bouvier, 1987), 95-6. Nothing ever came of Schopenhauer's proposal.

philosophical works of Hegel, Herbart, and Schleiermacher taken together” (WII 582/668), his attitude towards Hume was more ambivalent than is generally noted. He appreciated Hume’s role in awakening Kant from his “dogmatic slumber,” but Humean scepticism left Schopenhauer cold, and he never praised Hume’s attempt to become the Newton of the intellectual world. Schopenhauer even wrote of Hume’s “palpably false scepticism with regard to the law of causality” (WII 338fn./386fn.) that served to awaken the slumbering Kant.

Schopenhauer’s relationship to John Locke is curious and it is relatively unexplored in the secondary literature.⁴ Schopenhauer referred to Locke almost as frequently as he did to both Berkeley and Hume combined. This fact, however, does not tell us much about Schopenhauer’s attitudes to Locke’s philosophy. After all, he referred to both Hegel and Fichte more frequently than he did to Locke. Yet Schopenhauer’s references to Hegel and Fichte were derisive, peppered by harsh *ad hominem*s, and they always served to distance his views from those of his contemporaries. Things are different with his references to Locke. While he decried Locke’s realism, noted problems with his epistemology, Schopenhauer’s remarks about Locke tend to be positive. For example, Schopenhauer called Locke “a real *summus philosophus*” (BM 22/xxvii) in the vitriolic first preface to his *Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik* (1841). Certainly part of Schopenhauer’s motivation in this preface was to contrast Locke with Hegel and Fichte, both of whom he recognized as the *summi philosophi* whose treatment by him in “Über das Fundament der Moral” provoked the Royal Danish Society of Scientific Studies to note their grave offense within their decision not to award his essay the prize in their contest, despite its being the only entry. Schopenhauer even noted that it was to Locke’s credit that “Fichte calls him the worst of all philosophers” (Ibid.).

Why did Schopenhauer refer to Locke more frequently than he did to his fellow classical British empiricists? Why did Schopenhauer regard Locke as a *summus philosophus*? To answer these questions, it is necessary to understand how Schopenhauer viewed Kant’s relationship to Locke, since he saw himself intimately related to Locke through a mediation by Kant: “Accordingly, it will be seen that Locke, Kant, and I are closely connected, since in the interval of almost two hundred years we present the gradual development of a coherently consistent train of thought” (PI 87f./93f.). Insofar as Schopenhauer considered himself

⁴ Schopenhauer’s library at his death contained three books by Locke: *On the Conduct of the Understanding, with Other Pieces* (London, 1870); *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 14th ed. (London, 1753); and *Two Treatises of Government* (London, 1772), see Arthur Schopenhauer: *Der handschriftliche Nachlaß*, ed. Arthur Hübscher, Bd. V, 109. Two brief sets of remarks concerning Locke can be found in Schopenhauer’s student notebook, see Arthur Schopenhauer: *Manuscript Remains*, trans. E. F. J. Payne (Oxford: Berg, 1988), Vol. 2, 444-46. Hübscher dates the first set of notes, “Locke I,” Summer 1812, and the second, “Locke II”, January 1816.

a Kantian, and as he saw Kant as Lockean, Schopenhauer viewed his philosophy standing in a philosophical lineage traceable to Locke. Schopenhauer also tended to view his relationship to Kant in terms comparable to those through which he conceived Kant's relationship to Locke. Just as Schopenhauer claimed that his philosophy transcended Kant's, while retaining fidelity to Kantian insights, he claimed that Kant's philosophy transcended Locke's, while retaining fidelity to Lockean insights. But Schopenhauer's fidelity to Kant extends only to dimensions of his metaphysics and epistemology. Schopenhauer radically rejected Kant's practical philosophy, and he used the empirically minded Locke as an ally against Kant's ethics.

Locke and Kant

Schopenhauer thought that the relationship between the ideal and real, between the subjective and the objective, that is, the relationship between how things appear to us with things in themselves, to be "the axis on which the whole of modern philosophy turns" (PI 15/15). Schopenhauer credited Descartes with bringing the question of the relationship of the ideal and the real to modern philosophical consciousness. Yet Schopenhauer rejected the epistemic commitments of the continental rationalists, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. Following Kant, Schopenhauer denied the theses that reason is superior to experience as a source of knowledge and that substantive knowledge of the world could be obtained by a priori demonstrations. Schopenhauer averred that Locke, under the influences of Bacon and Hobbes, "insisted on investigating the *origin of concepts* and made the sentence 'no innate ideas' the basis of his philosophy" (PI 45/49). Schopenhauer claimed that Locke's rejection of innate ideas led him to reject pure reason as a source of knowledge, and that this "lead [Locke] back to what is perceptive [*anschauliche*] and to experience [*Erfahrung*]" (WII 40/41), to discover the origin of concepts. Locke's return to that which is given in experience led Schopenhauer to call Locke the progenitor of his philosophical method: "We must regard Locke as the originator of this method of consideration: Kant brought it to an incomparably higher perfection, and our first book [the original volume of *The World as Will and Representation*] together with its supplements [the second volume], is devoted to this method" (WII 272/307).⁵

⁵ Schopenhauer maintained a largely empiricistic account of concepts, and he had little sympathy (if he understood it at all) for Kant's view of concepts as rules for organizing sensory representations. Much like Locke, Schopenhauer held that "concepts have arisen through abstraction, and are wholly universal representations which differ from all particular things" (WII 66/70).

Schopenhauer seems to have drawn his understanding of a philosophical connection between Locke and Kant due to a remark made by Kant in his *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*.⁶ Within the context of defending himself against the charge of idealism, which Kant understood as “the assertion that there are none but thinking beings, all others which we think are perceived in intuition [*Anschauungen*], being nothing but the representations in the thinking being to which no object external to them in fact corresponds,” Kant referred to Locke’s attribution of secondary qualities, i.e., color, odor, temperature, and taste, to our ideas of things and not things in themselves. Kant argued that “as little as the man who admits colors not to be the properties of the object itself, but only as modifications of the sense of sight, should on that account be called an idealist, so little can my thesis be named idealistic merely because I find that none, nay, *all the properties which constitute the intuition of a body belong merely to its appearance.*”⁷ Kant then claimed that all that he had done was to make primary qualities, i.e., extension, place, shape, and impenetrability, belong to the appearance of things and not to the object in itself. Kant concluded that this is not idealism, since he did not deny the existence of objects external to the perceiver. Rather, he simply denied that we could know these objects.

Schopenhauer read Kant as if he retained a general Lockean framework by simply elevating Locke’s primary qualities to the status of a priori forms of cognition. That is, whereas Locke conceived of objects beyond consciousness as bearing primary qualities and serving as the cause of our ideas of things, Kant retained the Lockean idea that these mind-independent objects, of which we have no knowledge, still exist as causes of ideas. So Schopenhauer claimed that “By his presentation Kant certainly deprived the real or thing in itself of materiality, but for him it also remained a wholly unknown x” (PI 87/93). Schopenhauer viewed Kant as substituting, in place of Locke’s material object, an unknown x as the cause of our sensuous representations. Schopenhauer even credited Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities as “the origin of the distinction between thing in itself and appearance, which later on in the Kantian philosophy becomes so very important” (PI 17/17).

Schopenhauer thought that Kant’s reliance on Locke exposed the “Achilles heel” (PI 89/95) of his philosophy. Following the lead of his first philosophy professor, the sceptical philosopher G. E. Schulze, Schopenhauer also believed

⁶ Schopenhauer refers to *Prolegomena* (Academy 289) at WI 418/495. It is curious to note that Schopenhauer translated this passage into English, and that he sent it as an example of his translating skills within a proposal to translate a number of Kant’s works, see Arthur Schopenhauer: *Gesammelte Briefe*, ed. Arthur Hübscher (Bonn, Bouvier Verlag, 1987), 122-23.

⁷ Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1950), 36 (Academy 288-89).

⁸ *Prolegomena*, 37 (Academy 289).

that Kant's introduction of the thing in itself involved the transcendent use of the principle of causality. Consequently, Schopenhauer charged that Kant never provided a "strict deduction of the thing in itself" (PI 90/96), since he illicitly employed the principle of causality.⁹ That Kant was guilty of using the principle of causality transcendentally must have struck Schopenhauer as more than obvious in the light of the earlier cited passage in the *Prolegomena* where Kant defended his position against the charge of idealism. There Kant claimed that we know only appearances of things, "that is, the representations which they [things in themselves] cause in us by affecting our senses. Consequently I grant by all means that there are bodies without us, that is, things which, though quite unknown to us as to what they are themselves, we yet know by the representations which their influence on our sensibility procures us."¹⁰ As Kant argued, this view is contrary to idealism. Thus Schopenhauer read Kant as applying the principle of causality beyond the limits of possible experience and as viewing things in themselves as the cause of sensuous representations. He also viewed this as a failure by Kant to maintain a commitment to an idealism that was clearly expressed in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.¹¹

While Schopenhauer viewed Kant as advancing beyond Locke, Schopenhauer's philosophical method harkens back to Locke in a significant way. As Paul Guyer has recently argued, Schopenhauer's rejection of Kant's transcendental arguments reveals that Schopenhauer employed "a more straightforward method of the scrutiny of experience itself, a method more akin to the empiricism of Hume before him."¹² Yet if we are looking for "kinship" between Schopenhauer and the classical British empiricists, Locke would have been a better referent here than Hume, especially if we are trying to understand which philosophers he considered his direct philosophical ancestors. Schopenhauer's phenomenological method shows his Lockean heritage when he exploited self-consciousness as the means for tunneling into the thing in itself. Locke recognized sensation and reflection as the source of all of our ideas. Schopenhauer rejected sensation, or our consciousness of external things, as a path to the thing in itself. Reflection, or self-consciousness, became the means through which Schopenhauer claimed to discover the key for solving the problem of the real and ideal and the problem all philosophers after Descartes tried to solve. This is

⁹ Schulze made this charge in his anonymously published *Aenesidemus* (1792). Schopenhauer refers to Schulze's critique of Kant at (PI 90/96; 94/101).

¹⁰ *Prolegomena*, 36 (Academy 289).

¹¹ A good discussion of Schopenhauer's charge about Kant's failure of nerve concerning idealism is found in Christopher Janaway's *Self and World in Schopenhauer's Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 58-67. Janaway also discusses *Prolegomena* 37 (Academy 289) at 69-78.

¹² Paul Guyer, "Schopenhauer, Kant, and the Methods of Philosophy," in *The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 94.

done, he argued, “by availing ourselves of the *self-consciousness* of the subject of knowledge, and by making it the exponent of the *consciousness of other* things, i.e., of the intuitively perceiving intellect. This path taken by me is the only correct one, the narrow portal to truth” (PI 94/100). Through the path of self-consciousness Schopenhauer viewed the will as the essence of all representations, and upon the self-conscious experience of the will, he thought that he discovered in experience the key for providing a comprehensive explanation of the totality of experiences.

An Empirical Ethics

The differences in Kant and Schopenhauer’s methodologies become especially pronounced in his critique of Kant’s moral philosophy. Schopenhauer developed an empirically-based, descriptive virtue ethics in contrast to Kant’s nonempirical, prescriptive ethics of duty. Schopenhauer made it clear that his ethical methodology was radically opposed to Kant’s: “I assume, on the other hand [against Kant], that the purpose of ethics is to indicate, explain, and trace to its ultimate ground the extremely varied behavior of humans from a moral point of view. Therefore there is no other way for discovering the foundation of ethics than the empirical ... This is the humble path to which I direct ethics; it contains no constructions a priori, no absolute legislation for all rational beings *in abstracto*” (BM 130/195). It should not be a surprise that Schopenhauer would appeal to the empirically minded Locke to help him travel his “humble path” to ethics.

Schopenhauer mounted a sustained attack against Kant’s ethics in *On the Basis of Morality*, which he viewed as his equivalent to Kant’s *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*. The main aim of Schopenhauer’s critique of Kant was to clear the grounds for the erection of his own foundation for morality, which, he claimed, “is, in essentials, diametrically opposed to Kant’s” (BM 47/115). Schopenhauer here implicitly reversed his analysis of Kant’s relationship to Locke, suggesting that Locke managed some moral insights superior to Kant’s. While Schopenhauer referred only twice to Locke within his criticisms of Kantian ethics, and although he even miscited his only quote from Locke’s *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Lockean perspectives sustain two of the more significant problems he alleged against Kant.

One of the main lines of argumentation Schopenhauer employed against Kant’s practical philosophy involved his attempt to show that it was “an inversion and a disguise of theological ethics” (BM 103/168). Schopenhauer argued that many of Kant’s basic moral concepts, such as “moral law” “command,” “duty,” and “obligation,” taken in a categorical sense, that is, as unconditionally

binding on agents despite their interests, were uncritically borrowed from Judeo-Christian theology. The problem, as Schopenhauer saw it, was that Kant, who correctly maintained that ethics were independent from theology, used moral terms whose significance required a theological context. So Schopenhauer viewed Kant's moral theology as not resting on his ethics, but as being presupposed by his ethics all along. Schopenhauer's diagnosis of Kant's ethics is that "Kant's method consisted in his making the result that which ought to have been the principle or presupposition (theology), and in taking as presupposition that which should have been deduced as result (the order or command). But now after he had turned the thing upside down, nobody, not even he himself, recognized it for what it was, namely the old, well-known theological morals" (BM 57f./126).

Schopenhauer detected the first false step in Kant's ethics in his assumption that practical philosophy provides laws stating what "*ought to happen, even though it may never happen*" (BM 52/120).¹³ This unfounded assumption, Schopenhauer contended, enabled Kant to develop a system of ethics in a legislative, imperative form, but by rejecting any empirical or theological grounds for his conception of moral laws, Kant robbed himself of any frameworks that would provide significance to his idea of a moral law. Schopenhauer believed that Kant tipped his hand concerning the theological roots of his ethics within his discussion of the absolute necessity of moral laws in the preface to the *Groundwork*, where Kant used the command "Thou shalt not lie [*Du sollt nicht lügen*]" as an example of a moral law categorically binding on all rational beings.¹⁴ Schopenhauer noted that Kant followed an archaic German practice of translating the Decalogue using "*du sollt*" and not the standard "*du sollst*." Schopenhauer argued that the idea of a moral law is meaningful within a theological context, since within this context moral laws represent the will of God, a being that has the power of enforcing laws through punishments and rewards. Kant, however, officially separated ethics from this theological context, Schopenhauer noted, and "separated from the theological hypotheses from which they came, these concepts lose all meaning" (BM 54-5/122-3). Schopenhauer then read Kant's moral theology as reintroducing the framework necessary to give meaning to his idea of moral law, since through his conception of the supreme good and the postulates of practical reason it now becomes reasonable to believe that there is "a reward, plus the immortality of the person to be rewarded, and a rewarder" (BM 55/123).

¹³ Schopenhauer is quoting here from Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Academy 426. The emphasis is Schopenhauer's.

¹⁴ See Kant, *Ibid*, Academy 389.

Schopenhauer claimed that Kant had attempted to provide meaning for his moral concepts prior to introducing his moral theology “by speaking of *absolute* ought and *unconditioned* duty” (BM 55/123). He argued, however, that this move failed, since the ideas of either an “absolute ought” and “unconditioned duty” were a “*contradictio in adjecto*” (Ibid.). To make this point, Schopenhauer quoted Locke: “For since it would be utterly in vain to suppose a rule set to the free actions of man, without annexing to it some enforcement of good and evil to determine his will; we must, wherever we suppose a law, suppose also some reward or punishment annexed to that law” (Ibid.).¹⁵ This Lockean requirement entailed, he continued, that “Every ought is thus necessarily conditioned by punishment or reward; consequently, to use Kant’s language, it is essentially and inevitably *hypothetical*, and never *categorical*, as he asserts” (Ibid.). Schopenhauer suggested that Kant ultimately sensed the absurdity of the concept of an unconditioned obligation, since he was moved in the *Critique of Practical Reason* to introduce the framework that provided significance to his claims, namely the postulates of practical reason, the ideas of “a reward, plus the immortality of the person to be rewarded, and a rewarder” (Ibid.). While Kant’s postulates of practical reason reintroduced meaning to Kant’s allegedly categorical conception of moral laws, Schopenhauer also argued that this move undermined Kant’s insight that self-interest cannot be the motive for actions possessing moral worth.

Schopenhauer’s points against Kant are largely Lockean in nature. Within an extended argument against innate practical or moral principles, Locke observed that “...what duty is cannot be understood without a law; nor a law be known or supposed without a lawmaker, or without reward and punishment.”¹⁶ In the same chapter of *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, from which Schopenhauer had quoted, Locke recognized three types of moral laws, namely, divine law, civil law, and what he called the law of opinion or reputation, the customs or mores of a particular society.¹⁷ Moral laws, according to Locke, state rules for the voluntary conduct of humans, and the nature of a law entails some agency that enforces sanctions. As Nicholas Wolterstorff has characterized Locke’s view: “A rule for voluntary action is a law if someone who wills that the rule be followed has the power to attach, and does attach, rewards and punishments – that is, good and evil – to the observance or breach of the rule.”¹⁸

¹⁵ Schopenhauer miscites this passage from Locke’s *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. It is from Book II, Chapter 28, Section 6, and not Chapter 33.

¹⁶ See *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 2 vols. (New York: Dover Publications, 1959). Reference to the *Essay* will state book, chapter, and paragraph, before the semicolon, followed by the volume and page of the Dover edition. This quote is from I.ii.12;1.76.

¹⁷ See *Essay* II.xxviii.7; 1.475.

¹⁸ Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Locke’s Philosophy of Religion,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Locke*, ed. Vere Chappell (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1994), 180-81.

The ability to promise reward and threaten punishment is crucial for the lawmaker, Locke believed, because it is the prospect of some good for compliance with the law, or the threat of some evil for disobedience, that motivates a voluntary action. Locke's definition of "good" and "evil" were hedonistic: "...what is apt to produce pleasure in us we call *good*, and what is apt to produce pain in us we call *evil*,"¹⁹ and his metaethics points to his deeply hedonistic account of motivation. As J. B. Schneewind has succinctly put it, "Locke was a hedonist about motivation, holding that only prospects of pleasure and pain can motivate us."²⁰ To be more specific, Locke held that a felt "*uneasiness of desire*, fixed on some absent good: either negative, as indolence to one in pain; or positive, as enjoyment of pleasure" motivates action.²¹ Thus if a law is to motivate behavior, it must be backed by sanctions or rewards, to generate a sense of uneasiness within the agent, either from a discontentment with his or her present condition, because the agent lacks this pleasure, or from an uneasiness resulting from the prospect of future pain or punishment. Without some lawmaker or other agency having the ability to promise some good or threaten some evil, Locke argued that a rule could not function as a law. A rule like "You should not lie," could not function itself to move an agent not to lie, since it would not itself make an agent "uneasy." Consequently, Locke argued: "It would be in vain for one intelligent being to set a rule to the actions of another, if he had it not in his power to reward the compliance with, and punish deviation from his rule, by some good and evil that is not the natural product and consequence of the action."²² If this good or evil were a natural product of an agent's action, Locke suggested that a rule prescribing conduct would not be a law, since "being a natural convenience or inconvenience, [it] would operate of itself, without a law."²³ In other words, a law would be redundant; agents would be moved by their natural desires.

Locke's view of the nature of moral laws and his hedonistic account of human motivation entail that Kant's law conception of ethics is practically ineffective, since a Kantian law lacks the means of generating the "uneasiness" required to move an agent to act. It would be possible, on Locke's account, for an agent to act according to a Kantian law, but only if the agent perceived the law as a means for securing some desired pleasure or for avoiding some feared pain. That

¹⁹ See *Essay* II.xxi.43; 1.340.

²⁰ See J. B. Schneewind, "Locke's Moral Philosophy," in *The Cambridge Companion to Locke*, 203.

²¹ See *Essay* II.xxi.33; 1.334. Also see Åke Petzäll, *Ethics and Epistemology in John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Göteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1937) 50-53 for an analysis of Locke's view of "uneasiness" as the only factor determining the will and his later view of free will.

²² See *Essay* II.xxviii.6; 1.474.

²³ See *Essay* II xxviii; 1.474.

is, a categorical moral law such as "You should not lie" only motivates if the agent would see compliance with the law providing the agent with either a desired good or an avoidance of an evil. This analysis naturally leads to Schopenhauer's point, which he made immediately after quoting Locke. Kant's alleged categorical laws are hypothetical if they are conatively affective, e.g., the categorical law "You should not lie" is really hypothetical, i.e., "If you desire a good reputation and/or wish to avoid a bad one, then you should not lie." This hypothetical law motivates, if it motivates at all, only if the agent desires that which is mentioned in the antecedent clause of the hypothetical statement and the agent experiences an "uneasiness."

Although Schopenhauer's critique of Kant's ethics relied on some of Locke's moral insights, it is also the case that he would have rejected Locke's ethics. It is perhaps ironic that his rejection of Locke's ethics would be based on his allegiance to insights he attributed to Kant; namely, that self-interested actions lacked moral worth and that "the ethical significance of human conduct is metaphysical, in other words, that it reaches beyond phenomenal existence and touches eternity" (BM 54/122). Locke's hedonistic account of motivation renders all behavior, including moral behavior, self-interested. Consequently, actions that Locke would judge as morally good, those that complied with divine law, civil law, or the law of opinion or reputation, are all performed, he thought, to either avoid a punishment or secure a reward. Moreover, Locke's hedonism kept him from realizing the metaphysical significance of human conduct, Schopenhauer would have argued, because Locke failed to recognize the very incentive that Schopenhauer would use to explain the metaphysical significance of human conduct, compassion (*Mitleid*). Yet Schopenhauer would not have accused Locke of unwittingly betraying his own insights as he did Kant. Locke did not ascribe to Kant's insights, and so it is not surprising that he would have a law conception of ethics. Consequently, Schopenhauer would have recognized that Locke was consistent, but just mistaken. With Kant, however, his law conception of ethics was inconsistent with his own goals. Schopenhauer's ethics of compassion, his empirical ethics, attempted to both show that humans could act nonegoistically and that the incentive for such actions was metaphysically significant. In this regard, just as in his theoretical philosophy, Schopenhauer's practical philosophy sought to expose the thing in itself via a deeper examination of moral experience.