

“The Second Philosophy” of Arthur Schopenhauer: Schopenhauer and Radical Empiricism

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Introduction

In this paper I want to point out and explore the connection between Schopenhauer and American philosophy, more precisely, American classical pragmatism. The story of the relation between American thought and Continental philosophy is of course a complex one, having multiple historical roots. With regard to pragmatism, this special kind of relation between the both traditions can be illustrated with a recent example. It is beyond doubt that one of Richard Rorty’s greatest merits lies precisely in the special attention he dedicated to establishing a bridge between the abovementioned traditions. In his essay “Some American Uses of Hegel” Rorty points to the importance of Hegel for both Royce and Dewey (Rorty also discusses Sellars and Brandom as the second pair of American neo-Hegelians in his essay). Being a Hegelian only in his youth, Dewey later radically changed his mind about Hegel. Rorty thus contends:

As with Marx, Hegel’s historicism gave Dewey the ideas that were central for his later work, but both men bracketed those passages in Hegel that did not chime with Darwin.¹

This example indicates the uses of Hegel in Dewey’s mature thought. For Dewey, the ‘good Hegel’ was only “the Herderian Hegel, the historicist who made only an occasional perfunctory bow to the eternal”² and the same holds for Rorty’s view of Marx, Hegel and others.

In her recent book *The Highpriest of Pessimism*³, Christa Buschendorf has shed light on the history of reception of Schopenhauer in the USA prior to Dewey (with an exception of Schopenhauer’s influence on Dewey’s contemporary George Santayana). Here, we are facing the reverse situation: Early American philosophers were *not* willing to grant Schopenhauer any important merit –

1 Richard Rorty: Some American Uses of Hegel. In: *Das Interesse des Denkens: Hegel aus heutiger Sicht*. Hrsg. von W. Welsch u. K. Vieweg. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag 2003, p. 35.

2 Op. cit., p. 37.

3 Buschendorf, Christa: *The Highpriest of Pessimism. Zur Rezeption Schopenhauers in den USA*. Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter 2008.

in the sense of a novelty of his thought – except for labelling him a philosopher of pessimism and as such a part of the metaphysical tradition. One of the key tenets within this history of reception is the conviction of many American philosophers about the utterly pessimistic character of Schopenhauer’s thought. What we find in pragmatist thought (like that of James and Dewey or Rorty), is primarily a *melioristic* scenario, like that echoed by Joshua Foa Dienstag in his book *Pessimism*:

Pessimism’s goal is not to depress us, but to edify us about our condition and to fortify us for the life that lies ahead.⁴

Thus, it does not come as a surprise that James was sharp in his criticism of Schopenhauer in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*⁵. According to James Schopenhauer is a successor of Kant who takes his philosophy to the extreme. He describes him as a metaphysician who does not pay sufficient attention to the progressive developments of his time.

This is, as I will show in my analysis, a profound misunderstanding. Schopenhauer’s greatest merit, as I see it, lies in the fact that he was attuned to the most recent developments of his age. I even think that, alongside Marx, Comte and Schelling, Schopenhauer should be seen as belonging to the most important strand of anti-Hegelians of the 19th century – to the group of key thinkers, responsible for a series of radical interventions into the history of Western philosophy.⁶ I would like to defend this claim on the following pages by pointing to

4 See Dienstag, Joshua Foa: *Pessimism: Philosophy, Ethic, Spirit*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2006, p. ix. Cited after Buschendorf, op. cit., p. 11f.

5 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 102. He wrote about Schopenhauer and Nietzsche as follows: “The sallies of the two German authors remind one, half the time, of the sick shriekings of two dying rats. They lack the purgatorial note which religious sadness gives forth.” For citation see *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. In: James, W.: *Writings 1902–1910*. Ed. by B. Kuklick. New York: Literary Classics of the United States 1987, p. 42.

6 August Comte’s *Cours de philosophie positive* was published between 1830 and 1842; Karl Marx’s *Manuscripts* in 1844; Schelling delivered his lectures on positive philosophy (*The Berlin Lectures*) in 1841–1842/43. For an excellent account on this epoch see Marcuse, H.: *Reason and Revolution*. London and New York: Routledge 2000. Marcuse does not refer to Schopenhauer in this context, of course, but I would argue that Schopenhauer’s philosophy is fully in line with the developments of his contemporaries. All of them have been famous for their critical contributions to the so called ‘negative philosophy’, but not Schopenhauer. For Marcuse, both Comte and Schelling expressed “a common tendency to counter the sway of apriorism and to restore the authority of experience” (p. 324). Furthermore, “positive philosophy studied the social realities after the pattern of nature” for “independence of matters of fact was to be preserved”, and, finally, “reasoning was to be directed to an acceptance of the given” (p. 326f.). The positive philosophy was then intended to be “a true ‘science of experience’” (p. 324). I find Schopenhauer’s epistemological ‘turn’ and his practical ethics as an equivalent, if not even a more progressive step within the above mentioned philosophical constellation of his age. See, for example, Schopenhauer, A.: *On the Basis of Morality*. Trad. by E. F. J. Payne. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett

pointing to a possible relation between Schopenhauer and American representatives of this critical strand in philosophy, the radical and immediate empiricism of William James and John Dewey. In his *Radical Empiricism* James, it is true, does not refer to Schopenhauer. Once labelled a ‘metaphysician’, Schopenhauer was rendered distant from James’ ideas if not diametrically opposed. The only person, perhaps, to understand the novelty in Schopenhauer’s philosophy was James’ colleague Josiah Royce. Royce knew that it is in his naturalistic tendencies (neglected by other scholars of his time) that we have to search for the real merits of his philosophy. He understood that “[t]he philosopher must become a naturalist”⁷ and was able to separate Schopenhauer from Fichte and Schelling. Schopenhauer for him was a thinker of the transition from romantic idealism to modern realism. On the basis of this testimony Buschendorf rightly concludes that it is precisely in this epistemological turn (and *not* in his ethical or theological concerns) that Schopenhauer’s project comes very close to the related aspirations of pragmatism. I will defend this claim by arguing that it was a certain inability of Schopenhauer to develop and present fully his version of ‘naturalistic’ philosophy in *The World as Will and Representation* that has prevented his contemporaries (like James) and others to understand and appreciate the importance of his ideas.

Although Schopenhauer with several of his key analyses anticipated the coming of great changes in philosophy (positive philosophy; Nietzsche and James, followed by Bergson, Husserl and Dewey) he still considered reality as a metaphysical entirety/totality. The pragmatist philosopher H. M. Kallen in his essay on *Radical Empiricism* rightly says that Schopenhauer is the last (great) philosopher prior to James who, in analysing reality, was interested in the metaphysical questions of reality.⁸ If, on the other hand, it is precisely *Radical Empiricism* that is the first that “lays no weightier emphasis on mind than on nature, on environment than on organism, on concept than on percept,”⁹ then the same shift takes place in to Schopenhauer’s scheme of philosophy in the first two books of

Publishing Co. 1995, p. 10: “Then in the *positive* part I have discovered the genuine source of morally praiseworthy actions and have actually *proved* that this is the source and that there can be no other” (see his §§ 16–19 on the basis of ethics).

7 Buschendorf, *The Highpriest of Pessimism*, p. 116f: “It is this thought of Schopenhauer’s that brings him very near to the position of most students of modern science” (Royce, in *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy: An Essay in the Form of Lectures*, 1892). For an alternative view on Fichte as a “precursor of a concept of practical intersubjectivity” see Joas, Hans: *G. H. Mead, A Contemporary Re-examination of His Thought*. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press 1997, p. 48ff. (for the citation see p. 50).

8 Kallen, H. M.: *Empiricism and Philosophic Tradition*. In: *The Philosophical Review* 22 (March 1913), No. 2, p. 157. On a transition period and Schopenhauer cf. note 6 of this essay on the so called positive philosophy.

9 *Op. cit.*, p. 163.

The World as Will and Representation. Schopenhauer clearly strove to attain a neutrality or a balance in searching for an answer to the question of how the world (the Will) is related to its observer (a particular Self). However, the turn that took place when he existentially leaned on art as the unparalleled integrator, and afterwards on suffering as the unparalleled ethical imperative asceticism, this neutrality was lost, clearly positioning Schopenhauer at the end of a long succession of thinkers of the metaphysical narrative. Any system of philosophy is loaded with personal emphasis, “a passion for logical unity on the one side, and for the conservation of valuable forms of existence on the other.”¹⁰ It was precisely this passion that turned Schopenhauer to the world of art, which in his view was alone suited to the new mediatory role meant to replace the old role of the subject of representation.

I

The profound affinity between Schopenhauer and Radical Empiricism is documented by Schopenhauer’s method of observing reality and its phenomena and his reliance of on the achievements of the natural sciences of his time. In the second book of *The World as Will and Representation*, metaphysical ways of speaking like that of “objectifications of the Will” serve only as metaphors for a number of empirical phenomena, which already in the first book had been freed from the old epistemological modes of subjective knowledge. The body, as the first representation, revealed to the thinker the world as Will – the immediate world as the effects of matter. However, by shifting into the world of Platonic ideas in the third book, Schopenhauer undertook a task that could only have one possible solution: Dismissing the principle of reason was now only possible through the brilliant artistic act, and through related forms of artistic contemplation of ideas, and, analogously through the world as suffering, and the related conception of his main ‘existentials’ (guilt, conscience, grace, the path of salvation) based on the negation of Will, or asceticism. His own scheme of philosophy, in the development of which he proceeded around or, more precisely, *over and above* Kant, turns back on itself and can only boomerang. Thus, already in the second book, Schopenhauer is forced to start discussing Platonic ideas as the models of objectifications of the Will, although methodologically, these ideas do not yet belong there at all, as the theme discussed in this book is the world as Will.¹¹

In American philosophy, William James (1842–1910) seems to have played the role that his contemporary Nietzsche, and afterwards Husserl, jointly played within the European tradition. With his pragmatist distaste for searching for the

¹⁰ Op. cit., p. 164.

¹¹ On issues concerning Schopenhauer’s ‘popular’ consideration of Plato see Ingenkamp, H. G.: Der Platonismus in Schopenhauers Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik. In: *Jb.* 70 (1989), pp. 45–66.

ultimate source of truth – a view he acquired from C. S. Peirce – he cut into American thought with a sharp Nietzschean knife, and with his radically empirical method, which he had himself worked out for this purpose following Hume and British empiricism, he thought ‘phenomenologically’ before Husserl.¹² The definite peak amongst his major contributions is no doubt his Radical Empiricism, which was the last creative phase in the evolution of his ideas.¹³

Radical Empiricism is characterised by the attempt to describe the facts of immediate empirical reality instead of stressing traditional forms of knowledge, which include Schopenhauer’s principle of reason. James’ *Essays on Radical Empiricism* were first published posthumously as a collection of texts written between 1884 and 1907 (the most important ones having been written in 1904 or 1905).¹⁴ James was the first to bring into philosophy the clearly conceptualised idea that the task of philosophy was to criticise any extra-experimental tendencies. One of the consequences of this approach was a deconstruction of the traditional notion of consciousness. Under the influence of Locke and Berkeley, he wrote: “I believe that ‘consciousness’, when once it has evaporated to this state of pure diaphaneity, is on the point of disappearing altogether.”¹⁵ On the other hand, his conceptions of pure experience as the only primary matter of the world and of knowing (‘current of thought’) as the relation among perceptions, open up a radically new perspective on empirical reality. James’ contemporary and follower Dewey (who was born in the same year as Husserl) adopted this view very early.¹⁶

James’ aim in philosophy was to consider the continuity of the process between an organism and the surrounding world. Through the experience of this continued process, the philosophy of pure empiricism attempts to do away with the duality/oppositions, i.e. the static and particularistic idea of the world (the former unifying the world with the substance and the latter leading to a connectionless disintegration of phenomena). According to James, the exact opposite is true – the world is already unified through a single process, and philosophy is a

12 On James and his influence on Husserl see Spiegelberg, H.: *The Phenomenological Movement*, 2 vols. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1960. James also influenced Brentano’s branch of phenomenology.

13 According to Larrabee, H. A.: The Radical Empiricism of William James. In: *The New England Quarterly*, 43 (1970), No. 2, p. 299 (Book Review).

14 James, W.: *Essays on Radical Empiricism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1976.

15 Op. cit., p. 3.

16 Dewey already published his version of Radical Empiricism, designated as ‘immediate empiricism,’ in 1905 in his article “The postulate of immediate empiricism” (Dewey, J.: *The Middle Works, 1899–1924*, Vol. 3. Ed. by Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press 1977, pp. 158–166.

continued reconstruction (here James draws on Dewey) of experience.¹⁷ For Radical Empiricism, what the empiricists had termed ‘ideas’ are ‘experiences’ as a process in time. In this respect, James’ empiricism is more radical than Hume’s in that it only thinks on the level of experience. The very possibility that the mind exists, and is active, is related by James to a sequence of experiences and ongoing transitions taking place in the interaction between an organism and the world/surroundings, where neither the organism nor the world are positioned within a sequence of subjective or objective aspects or constructions of reality. The two are arising in conjunction, one from the other and one *for* the other. Pure experience is not successively replicated in the mode of a ‘recording’ by representation:

There is no other *nature*, no other whatness than this absence of break and this sense of continuity in that most intimate of all conjunctive relations, the passing of one experience into another when they belong to the same self.¹⁸

II

In this way, James, who rejects both Hume’s and Kant’s solutions to the problem of the relationship between consciousness and empirical reality, stands in a profound relation to Schopenhauer. It is true, that the few instances in which James mentions the German philosopher do not suggest any actual influence. What is more important for us is to demonstrate how Schopenhauer’s final scheme, which remained imbued with the doctrine of suffering, can be related to James’ development of Radical Empiricism. If, with the world as representation, Schopenhauer attempted to overcome idealism while also negating the opposite, i. e. the materialist standpoint with the world as Will, we are faced with the question what consequences his thought would have had for philosophy had Schopenhauer in fact been able – unconstrained by the Platonic tradition and Kant’s philosophy, and Christian and Indian religious conceptions – to consistently work it out.

Schopenhauer’s pronounced intention to think beyond the Kantian ban on approaching the thing-in-itself was only a variation on what philosophical empiricism had always been tempted to do – i. e. to approach the (pure) empirical object at the point of its entering human reason. Both Hume’s and Kant’s paths had failed in this respect, and Schopenhauer’s aim was to discover a new solution

17 James, W.: The Chicago School. In: *Writings 1902–1910*. New York: Literary Classics of the United States 1987, p. 1137. The essay was written in 1904. It is of course N. Whitehead who would be the key contributor to process philosophy.

18 Op. cit., p. 1163 ff. (the essay “A World of Pure Experience”).

that would be perfectly neutral in this regard. This is how he demarcates himself in relation to both previous solutions:

For the independence of the knowledge of causality from all experience, in other words, its *a priori* character, can alone be demonstrated from the dependence of all experience on it. Again, this can be done only by proving, in the manner here indicated, that the knowledge of causality is already contained in perception generally, in the domain of which all experience is to be found, and hence that it exists wholly *a priori* in respect of experience, that it does not presuppose experience, but is presupposed thereby as a condition. But this cannot be demonstrated in the manner attempted by Kant, which I criticize in the essay *On the Principle of Sufficient Reason* (§ 23).¹⁹

The world as representation and the world as Will make up an *entirety* of experience, which is based on the law of causality (space-time), i. e. principle of reason, but which is later (at the climax of the third book, in relation with music) reduced to the intuitive experience of time. According to Schopenhauer, art does not need a spatial dimension, and music as its highest form is a projection of the Will itself. The fact that he needs to resort to music precisely where his theory reaches an impasse reflects the problems he had with this most difficult part of the whole system, i. e., with the decisive, as he had announced, interpretation of the world as representation – the supposed elimination of everything subjective, which, by analogy, would also mean a Jamesian ‘evaporation’ of the objective and, consequently, a ‘mystical’ unification of the Self (*Ātman*) and the Will as the thing-in-itself (*Brāhman*).²⁰ In my opinion this actually does not happen: Precisely through aesthetic experience and, later, through ethics, Schopenhauer remains within the confines that he had tried to overcome. The path to a salvation from philosophy had been illusory, *māya* had not been unveiled. How, then, is it possible to think his ‘other philosophy’?

19 WWR, p. 13.

20 It would be interesting to also analyse in this perspective the analogous role that art has in the much later stage of Dewey’s philosophy, especially as his *Art as Experience* (1934) represents one of the key contributions to the development of his pragmatism. It is also interesting to point out the early American ‘connection’ to Indian philosophy via the transcendentalist philosophy. Emerson developed his Over-Soul relying on the Indian (Upanishadic) ‘Over-Soul’ (*adhyātman*), in which through *inner* knowledge, to put it in Emersonian fashion, the micro- and macrocosmic principles of the world, *brāhman* and *ātman*, abide in identity. See Carpenter, F. I.: *Emerson and Asia*. Cambridge: Harvard 1930; Christy, A.: *The Orient in American Transcendentalism; a Study of Emerson, Thoreau and Alcott*. New York: Octagon Books 1932; cf. also Thottackara, D.: *Emerson the Advaitin*. Bangalore 1986, and Goren, L.: Elements of Brahmanism in the Transcendentalism of Emerson. In: *Emerson Society Quarterly*. Supplement to 34, I Quarter 1964, pp. 34–37). For a bibliographic account of ‘Orient’ in transcendental periodicals see Mueller, R. C.: *The Orient in American Transcendental Periodicals (1835–1886)*. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Minnesota 1969, diss. For related bibliographic information on Emerson and Asia see also Buschendorf, C.: *The Highpriest of Pessimism*, p. 47 n. 27.

Schopenhauer's solution to what otherwise would be a contradiction is as follows: As for him pure materialism (objects existing independently from, or even without, the subject) cannot yield a solution, the subjective idealism of representation needs to be conceived in conjunction with its constituent empirical corrective of the things of the world as they are *in themselves* – not as representation but as some *entirety* of experience. The entirety of experience means a chance for a philosophy that would free itself from the pressures of the Will. Similarly, according to James, the danger removed by Radical Empiricism is an artificial dividing line and discontinuity between the subject and object of knowledge.²¹ Beyond the desire to establish a continuity through God, the transcendental Self or, as in Schopenhauer, Platonic ideas or the Upanishadic mode *tat tvam asi*, there is the possibility to envision “experience as a whole wear[ing] the form of a process in time.”²² This process comprises various types of experience. Naturally, they include *music* as well as the *suffering*. A dethronisation of music and pathodicea, in the mystical sense, only means a possibility of their new return in practice. Schopenhauer however was not yet ready for this as the time was not ripe for such ‘radical’ move – for him knowing (i. e. the world as representation) is only one aspect of experience. The other is that the ‘knowing subject’ feels its closest ‘object’ – the body (as an objectification of the Will; in ethics, for example, this would follow via compassion) –, and the two represent the entirety of experience (as a process).

Thus Schopenhauer is the first philosopher to stand on the threshold to this new philosophy. Only his personal and traditionally existential *Weltanschauung* (manifesting itself in his theory of art and moral philosophy as pathodicea and mysticism) prevents him from consistently and purposefully developing his new thought. His epistemological standpoint, however, enables him to occasionally catch a glimpse of and already conceptualise the new *experience*, which was later to integrate the subjective and objective into a seamless connectivity, overcoming the epistemological necessities to consider experience as something that only concerns the knowing subject. Already in Schopenhauer, experience, to quote from Dewey's “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy” (1917), lies in the connectedness and intercourse “of a living being with its physical and social environment.”²³ Furthermore, Dewey's analyses of the “brain and nervous system as organs of action-undergoing” and his assertion “that primary experience is of a corresponding type” is precisely what Schopenhauer had striven for in the first book of *The World as Will and Representation*:

21 James, op. cit., p. 1165.

22 Ibid., p. 1169.

23 J. Dewey: The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy. In: *Pragmatism and Classical American Philosophy*. Ed. by J. J. Stuhr. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000, p. 446.

Here, therefore, the body is for us immediate object, in other words, that representation which forms the starting-point of the subject's knowledge [...] I say that the body is immediately *known*, is *immediate object* [...] in other words, only in the brain does our own body first present itself as an extended, articulate, organic thing.²⁴

For Dewey knowledge is *embodied* intelligence, which comes very close to Schopenhauer's fundamental philosophical intentions, as well as to the analyses of the phenomenal world through the mode of *pratītyasamutpāda* (see the last note to the 4th book of *The World as Will and Representation*). It also testifies to a remarkable intuition that Schopenhauer had with regard to the importance of Indian philosophy. Hence, he is the key thinker of yet another transition – a transition to a philosophy that already thinks interculturally.²⁵ In relation to this, it is interesting to consider the thought of the contemporary Indian philosopher Krishna Roy, who in her essay “Hermeneutics in Indian Philosophy” concerned with intercultural applications of hermeneutics and phenomenology, believes that it is indeed in the classical Upanishads (which Schopenhauer admired) that we come across a philosophical model that can be highly relevant today. This is the method of a path to truth, which we reach by using the Upanishadic “experiential” (practical) method in modern philosophical contexts:²⁶ in today's jargon this means that truth cannot be reached by the discursive-intellectual path alone and that it can only be approached through “many-side life-experience.”²⁷ What is important is that, following Indian philosophical tradition, Roy, too, (like Schopenhauer, James and Dewey) argues for an importance of the complementary nature of full experience and knowledge:

Man is a spirit, an integral whole, consisting of his body, mind, intellect, passion and will and his reason alone can no more exhaust him than his animality can encompass his reason. Reason or rational thought is a part of his being.²⁸

24 For Dewey see *Experience and Nature* (New York: Dover), p. 23. for Schopenhauer see §6 of *The World as Will and Representation* (p. 19f.).

25 The American philosopher Nancy Frankenberry concludes her *Religion and Radical Empiricism* (New York: State University of New York Press 1987) precisely with a chapter in which radical empiricism and Whitehead's process philosophy are compared with the said Buddhist doctrine.

26 It consists of three stages in the process of knowing: listening (*śravaṇa*), reflection, or the process of gaining understanding (*manana*), and knowledge, or a practical application of what has been understood (*nidbidhyāsana*). See Roy, K.: Hermeneutics in Indian Philosophy. In: *Phenomenology and Indian philosophy*. Ed. by D. P. Chattopadhyaya, L. Embree and J. Mohanty. New Delhi: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology 1992, p. 298.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., p. 299.

This type of thought might be brought to bear on social and political philosophy, thereby overcoming the prejudice that Indian philosophy is ‘non-practical’ (in the modern sense).

III

Finally, let me briefly consider the consequences that the connections between Schopenhauer and Radical Empiricism can have for ethics. What is important is the possibility of a completely new ethics, which has in fact already developed out of themes that Schopenhauer had himself considered in his work. His insistence on a descriptive and empirical presentation of ethical problems and their constitution through *bodily* feelings (as something natural, closest to us and immediate) points to interesting links with various modern ethics of care and compassion.²⁹ All of these are Humean and anti-Kantian (such as Annette Baier’s ethics of care or Rorty’s pragmatist concept of an ethics of solidarity based on natural feelings like sympathy).³⁰ Furthermore, they distance themselves from both deontological and teleological forms: The only object of moral reflection is experience of primary ethical facts like the experience of closeness within family ties, which open up into the world and widen the circles of closeness to a final incorporation of all sentient beings. Hence, this path is not *a priori* determined by a knowledge of the Will as pathodicea and the related philosophical soteriology, as Schopenhauer would have it, but is predicated upon – analogously to the above described characteristics of Radical Empiricism – a recognition of each particular *experience* of the striking relatedness of the Self with other Selves, a relatedness that Schopenhauer, based on his observations on bodily experiences, saw as metaphysical knowledge in the sense that we are all part of one Will. Naturally, as Rorty would point out, the ideal in this practical ethical path comes close to the Christian or Buddhist (and Schopenhauer’s!) ideal personified by Francis of Assisi or Buddha.³¹ In this way Schopenhauer’s ethics, with its the understanding of interhuman existence as an existence in solidarity, can be seen to be an anticipation of the contemporary sense of a global and intercultural ethics that goes beyond all limits.

29 On the bodily aspect of ethics see my paper “Metaphysical ethics reconsidered: Schopenhauer, compassion and world religions” in *Jb.* 87 (2006), pp. 101–117. On some other aspects of the relation between Schopenhauer’s philosophy and pragmatism see my paper “Thinking Between Cultures: Pragmatism, Rorty and Intercultural Philosophy” in *Ideas y valores*, no. 138 (2008), pp. 41–71. http://www.ideasyvalores.unal.edu.co/archivos/PDF138/06_skof.pdf.

30 On this see my paper “From compassion to solidarity: the ethical self, values and the society” in *Synthesis philosophica* 20:1 (2005), pp. 141–150. In this piece I refer to Baier’s *Moral Prejudices* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1995) and Rorty’s *Philosophy and Social Hope* (London: Penguin 1999).

31 See R. Rorty’s important essay on pragmatist (Deweyan) ethics, “Ethics Without Principles”, in his *Philosophy and Social Hope* (London: Penguin, 1999).